



A host of errors can occur at sentencing, but whether a particular
sentencing error can be remedied may depend on whether judges
characterize errors as involving a "miscarriage of justice "-that is, a
claim of innocence. The Supreme Court's miscarriage ofjustice standard,
created as an exception to excuse procedural barriers in the context of
federal habeas corpus review, has colonized a wide range of areas of law,
from "plain error" review on appeal, to excusing appeal waivers, the
scope of cognizable claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the postconviction
statute for federal prisoners, and the "Savings Clause" that permits resort
to habeas corpus rather than § 2255. That standard requires a judge to ask
whether a reasonable decisionmaker would more likely than not reach the
same result. However, the use of the miscarriage of justice standard with
respect to claims of sentencing error remains quite unsettled In this
Article, I provide a taxonomy of types of innocence of sentence claims, and
describe how each has developed, focusing on federal courts. I question
whether finality should play the same role regarding correction of errors in
sentences, and I propose that a single miscarriage ofjustice standard apply
to all types of sentencing error claims, when not considering on appeal
under reasonableness review. Finally, I briefly describe how changes to the
sentencing process or sentencing guidelines could also reflect certain
concerns with accuracy.
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INTRODUCTION
A host of errors can occur at sentencing. What if the judge enhanced a
sentence based on a finding of a certain drug quantity, but it later emerges
that the lab technician was dry labbing, or failing to test or weigh the seized
contraband?' What if a judge calculated a sentence incorrectly due to a
routine clerical error?2 What if a judge followed an interpretation of a
I. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Charles, 992 N.E.2d 999, 1009 (Mass. 2013) (discussing review
of many thousands of cases potentially affected by crime lab misconduct); MICHAEL R. BROMWICH,
THIRD REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATOR FOR THE HOUSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT CRIME
LABORATORY AND PROPERTY ROOM 12-14 (2005),
http://www.hpdlabinvestigation.org/reports/050630report.pdf (discussing the use of DNA profiling in
crime labs); Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and Forensic Science: The Need to Regulate
Crime Labs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 163, 184 (2007) (describing the fallacy of hair samples used as evidence).
2. See Shawn D. Bushway, Emily G. Owens & Anne Morrison Piehl, Sentencing Guidelines
and Judicial Discretion: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Human Calculation Errors, 9 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 291, 298 (2012) (describing an "overall inaccuracy rate" of 10 percent
between 2001 and 2004 in calculating sentences under advisory guidelines in Maryland, as well as a
somewhat greater judicial tendency to catch and correct such errors when they result in higher
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sentencing guidelines provision that appellate courts later rejected as
incorrect? What if a judge gave a defendant a higher sentence based on
conduct or crimes that new evidence shows the person did not commit?
Which types of errors can an appellate judge later correct? Which types can
a postconviction judge correct, even if the claim was not procedurally
preserved in prior litigation? The answers may depend on whether judges
characterize errors as involving a "miscarriage of justice"-that is, a claim
of innocence.
Claims of innocence have a recognized status in postconviction law,
even if it is not necessarily easy for an inmate to litigate innocence. The
Supreme Court has yet to recognize a freestanding constitutional claim of
actual innocence, except by assuming hypothetically that it might violate
due process for an innocent person to be executed. However, judges and
lawmakers have fashioned a range of postconviction statutes and doctrines
excusing procedural barriers or providing access to relief if an inmate can
muster sufficient evidence of innocence.4 In particular, the miscarriage of
justice standard, created by the Court as an exception to excuse procedural
barriers in the context of federal habeas corpus review,s has colonized a
wide range of areas of law, from "plain error" review on appeal, to
excusing appeal waivers, to postconviction innocence "gateway" claims, to
the scope of cognizable claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the postconviction
statute for federal prisoners.
The use of the miscarriage of justice standard with respect to claims of
sentencing error remains quite unsettled. Judges and scholars speak of
"innocence of sentence" claims, but it is not clear which types of
sentencing errors should be called a "miscarriage," and given a more
privileged status over other sentencing errors.6 Despite the ubiquity of the
sentences).
3. The Court extended that hypothetical, for what that is worth, to a noncapital case in District
Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 67-75 (2009). For additional discussion of the possible
implications, see Brandon L. Garrett, Essay, DNA and Due Process, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2919, 2952-
59(2010).
4. Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REv. 1629, 1638-44 (2008)
(describing the various doctrines altering availability of postconviction relief based on showings of
innocence).
5. In 2013, the standard was extended to apply to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 statute of limitations in McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1935 (2013).
6. The phrase "innocence of sentence" or "actual innocence of sentence" has been used mostly
in the context of the miscarriage of justice exception to procedural defaults in federal habeas corpus
law. See, e.g., McKay v. United States, 657 F.3d 1190, 1196-98 (11th Cir. 2011). As discussed in the
sections that follow, however, federal courts have used "innocence" to refer to several types of
sentencing errors, in several different procedural postures. See infra Part II.
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miscarriage of justice standard, an error in sentencing is a far more elusive
concept than an innocence claim that a conviction is erroneous. A
sentencing error may not be binary like a conviction versus an acquittal, but
rather an error that affects when a sentence might be imposed along a
spectrum. At sentencing, the judge's role is to calibrate punishment by
taking into account the defendant's background, record, crime
characteristics, and other evidence, without constraint by formal rules of
evidence. Sentencing has become more complex and fact intensive,
particularly after the adoption of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, as well as
many state sentencing guidelines.' To be sure, sentencing can contribute to
a wrongful conviction. For example, innocent people can plead guilty in
exchange for a reduced sentence. We do not know how often that happens.8
Innocent people who plead guilty can sometimes obtain relief by
challenging the conviction based on new evidence of innocence, or claims
of prosecutorial misconduct or ineffective assistance of counsel during plea
bargaining. Far more complex, however, is the question of when and
whether to remedy a distinct error in the calculation of the sentence itself.
Nor have the Supreme Court's interventions into the law of sentencing
reduced the difficulty in identifying sentencing errors, much less correcting
them. The Court has focused on enhancing the factfinding role of the jury,
increasing a judge's discretion to depart from U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
recommendations, and requiring that the jury find facts that enhance the
maximum and minimum sentences.9 Those interventions have reduced
7. About half of the states use some type of sentencing guidelines. See U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, 2012 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS app. B (2012), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Research-andStatistics/AnnualReports-andSourcebooks/2012/sbtocl2.htm.
8. See, e.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS Go WRONG 150-53 (2011) (describing the cases of DNA exonerees who pleaded guilty,
most of whom had falsely confessed); Samuel R. Gross, Pretrial Incentives, Post-Conviction Review,
and Sorting Criminal Prosecutions by Guilt or Innocence, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 1009, 1018-19
(2011) (citing data from known individual exonerations, in which only 6 percent pleaded guilty in very
serious cases, but also examples from "mass" exonerations involving modest sentences dominated by
plea bargains). See also Gross, supra, at 1017 ("Plea bargaining does induce a very high proportion of
guilty defendants to plead guilty .. . . Plea bargaining also induces some innocent defendants to plead
guilty. Whether it improves the ratio of guilty to innocent defendants at trial is anybody's guess. We
can[not] observe the effect directly since we do[ not] know the proportions of innocent defendants
before and after plea bargaining.").
9. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) ("[The Court] may consider the extent of the
deviation, but must give due deference to the district court's decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a
whole, justify the extent of the variance."); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (finding
that the guidelines were "effectively advisory," and permitting courts to tailor sentences based on other
statutory factors). See also S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2350 (2012) (noting that
judicial discretion is subject to the limitation of a jury verdict); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 346
(2007) (finding that judicial discretion, when in accordance with appropriate guideline application, is
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certain types of factfinding by judges, but they are not focused on accuracy.
Indeed, judges now have more discretion to sentence, and therefore an
outright error might result in an appellate court requiring the judge to
resentence by exercising discretion again, which may result in the same
sentence.
Not only is it difficult to identify which types of sentencing errors
should be remedied under the miscarriage of justice heading, but also what
courts call a miscarriage of justice varies depending on the procedural
context. While that standard was developed most prominently in the
context of § 2254 federal habeas litigation by state prisoners, the same
standard applies during federal criminal appeals as part of decisions
regarding whether an unpreserved sentencing error satisfies the plain error
standard. Courts also excuse waivers in plea bargains of appellate and
postconviction remedies using the miscarriage of justice standard, which
includes asking what type of sentencing error might result.'o Additionally,
in a rich and complex body of law in cases brought under § 2255, which
permits postconviction motions by federal prisoners, federal judges have
considered whether to grant relief on sentencing claims using a miscarriage
of justice standard." As a result, judges have increasingly considered when
and whether to conceptualize sentencing related claims as ordinary or as
more serious claims implicating innocence. Courts of appeals have badly
split, and decisions in this area have engendered en banc opinions and
heated dissents. In general, lower courts have typically been reluctant to
permit late filed sentencing challenges, even after the Supreme Court has
altered the interpretation of guideline provisions. Lower courts have
opened the door more broadly if a convict can show innocence of a prior
conviction used to enhance the sentence, or for a legal error in interpreting
an element of an offense. Federal judges also ask whether the § 2255
"safety valve" provision permits access to habeas corpus remedies, by
asking if a sentencing error might result in a miscarriage of justice. Suffice
it to say that the miscarriage of justice caselaw in the sentencing error
context is deeply confused in the lower courts. Nor has the Supreme Court
spoken to these questions with any frequency to add much needed clarity.
"presumptively reasonable" (quoting United States v. Rita, 177 F. App'x 357, 358 (4th Cir. 2006));
infra Part I.B.
10. In addition, some courts suggest that a waiver may not apply if the sentence was imposed
after the plea was entered; others hold that the waiver was made by a defendant informed by the fact
that sentencing would be conducted subsequently by the judge. See 1 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S.
LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 41.7[b] (6th ed. 2012) (discussing
cases of procedural default).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 advisory committee's note (2012).
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A single miscarriage of justice standard should apply in each of the
varied contexts in which sentencing errors are raised. I argue that all
sentencing errors should be cognizable under the miscarriage of justice
standard. In the sentencing context, a judge does not ask whether a
reasonable juror could find guilt (except regarding jury findings on
sentence-related facts, or in states with jury sentencingl2), but instead asks
whether a reasonable judge would "more likely than not" adopt a different
sentence. A more likely than not standard is the Supreme Court's
miscarriage of justice standard, first clearly defined in Schlup v. Delo in the
context in which a habeas judge reviews a state conviction.' 3 Some judges
have explained they are willing to more flexibly review sentencing errors
given the reduced burden of conducting a resentencing as compared to the
burden of potentially retrying a case after vacating a conviction. Further, in
the context of state prisoner claims litigated under § 2254, having passed
through a miscarriage of justice gateway, the prisoner must still obtain
relief on an underlying constitutional claim permitting resentencing; that
claim will typically be a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at
sentencing. Sentencing errors are far easier to correct than erroneous
convictions, and they should be more broadly correctable on appeal and
postconviction.
In this Article, I explore the related innocence of sentence or
sentencing error-related miscarriage of justice doctrines. In Part I, I provide
a taxonomy of types of innocence of sentence claims and describe how
each has developed, focusing on federal courts. I question throughout
whether finality should play the same role regarding sentences as it does
regarding convictions. In Part II, I describe the different types of procedural
contexts in which sentencing error claims are litigated, beginning with
sentencing itself, and then how different miscarriage of justice or innocence
of sentence doctrines have been developed on appeal when deciding
whether to excuse plea bargain waivers in both § 2255 litigation and
federal habeas corpus proceedings. In Part III, I propose that a single
miscarriage of justice standard apply to the different types of sentencing
error claims in the various procedural contexts at which they may be
litigated. The Supreme Court's increased constitutional regulation of plea
bargaining may open the door to greater scrutiny of defense counsel's role
12. Nancy J. King, How Different is Death? Jury Sentencing in Capital and Non-Capital Cases
Compared, 2 OHO ST. J. CRIM. L. 195, 196 (2004).
13. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995) ("To establish the requisite probability, the
petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him
in the light of the new evidence.").
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in assuring accuracy during plea bargaining, and as a result, ineffective
assistance of counsel claims provide a vehicle to assert sentencing errors
even in state prisoner cases under § 2254.14 Although beyond the scope of
this Article, I briefly describe how changes to the sentencing process or
sentencing guidelines could also reflect certain concerns with accuracy.
I. TYPES OF SENTENCING ERROR CLAIMS
There are a range of types of sentencing errors and they have been
treated quite differently by courts, sometimes for good reason, and
sometimes based on questionable or unexplained distinctions. The sections
that follow provide a partial taxonomy of types of innocence of sentence
claims, focusing first on factual errors: (1) predicate facts, (2) predicate
crimes, and (3) computational errors; and second on legal errors in
sentencing, including mixed questions of fact and law, as to (1) greater
offenses, (2) sentencing enhancements, and (3) retroactive guidelines
amendments.
A. FACTUAL ERROR IN SENTENCING
1. Deference to Factual Errors in Sentencing
Factfinding plays a central role in the application of the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines, a problem that the Supreme Court has wrestled
with, but which has escaped resolution.' The detailed federal Sentencing
Table grid raises the possibility of bringing claims challenging errors as to
both of its axes, both the offense level and criminal history. The vertical
axis of the grid displays the offense level. Sentences may be enhanced
based on fact dependent aspects of the offense, which may not have been
proven at trial. Examples include presence of a weapon,16 quantity of
drugs," broadly defined conduct "relevant"'18 to the offense including
conduct "that is not formally charged or is not an element of the offense,"' 9
14. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1404 (2012) (involving plea offers that were not
provided to client by counsel); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1396 (2012) (involving habeas relief
based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel).
15. FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE COMMITTEE, AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL SENTENCING PROCEEDINGS, 177 F.R.D. 513, 513 (1998) ("Fact-finding
assumes a central, critical role under [g]uidelines sentencing.").
16. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(b)(1) (2012),
http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2012_Guidelines/Manual PDF/Chapter-2_D.pdf.
17. Id. § 2D1.1(c).
18. Id. § lB 1.3, available at http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2012_Guidelines/Manual_
PDF/Chapter 1.pdf.
19. Id. § 1B1.3 cmt. background. See also id. § 1BI.3(a)(1)(A) (the base offense level is
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or obstruction of justice as to the offense or a closely related one.20
Difficult factual questions may be raised concerning the amount of the loss
to victims, or intended loss.21 Perhaps, in contrast, acceptance of
responsibility and "substantial assistance" to the authorities are forms of
mitigation based on postoffense conduct that can be determined with more
flexibly.22 One might think the horizontal axis of the grid, which reflects
the criminal history of the defendant, would be more determinate. Yet as I
will develop, how to treat prior offenses that have been vacated, or
applying enhancements for a "career criminal," for example, can raise
complex questions.
A sentence may be calculated based on erroneous predicate facts. This
may be due to a clerical error by the judge, an error in making a guidelines
calculation, or a reliance on erroneous facts by the judge. The judge's error
may also arise due to an error by the probation officer, or because law
enforcement or the prosecutor supplied incorrect information. Of course,
the defendant might accede to a statement including incomplete or
erroneous facts, if doing so provides for a more lenient sentence. What if
the defendant later learns that incomplete or erroneous facts supported a
harsher sentence?
On appeal, a sentence may be challenged if imposed based on an
"incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines," or if in "violation of
law," but the relevant statutory section does not, clearly at least, speak to
errors of fact. 23 However, the Supreme Court noted in Gall v. United States
that a sentence may be procedurally unsound if based on "clearly erroneous
facts."24 A range of claims may challenge failures to mitigate the sentence
for any number of reasons, ranging from failure to acknowledge acceptance
of responsibility or cooperation, failure to consider the defendant's
background, or other mitigating evidence. While errors in sentence
enhancements may typically arise from factual determinations by the judge
based on the information presented, claims challenging failures to mitigate
determined by "all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced,
procured, or willflully caused by the defendant").
20. Id. § 3C1.1, available at http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2012_Guidelines/Manual
PDF/Chapter_3.pdf.
21. Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. application notes 3(A) (noting that the loss is the greater of the actual or
intended loss), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2012_Guidelines/Manual PDF/Chapter
2_A-C.pdf.
22. Id. § 5KIl.1, available at http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2012_Guidelines/Manual
PDF/Chapter 5.pdf. See also id. §3El.1 (discussing reduced sentences for acceptance of
responsibility).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) (2012).
24. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
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may also involve the situation in which mitigating evidence was never
presented by the defense, and the claim is that counsel was ineffective.
Appellate review of such factfinding is deferential, where as noted, the
underlying standard is broad, and evidence need not be admissible to be
part of the sentencing calculus. As the Sixth Circuit put it, "This standard
presents a 'relatively low hurdle."' 25 Harmless error, or plain error review
for unpreserved errors, also applies on appeal, including post-Booker v.
United States. 26 That said, the Supreme Court emphasized in Porter v.
McCollum that the same Strickland v. Washington standard applies for
sentencing errors: whether "but for his counsel's deficiency, there is a
reasonable probability he would have received a different sentence." 27 in
Porter, the Court emphasized, that despite being in the context of the
punishment phase of a capital case, that "[t]he judge and jury at Porter's
original sentencing heard almost nothing that would humanize Porter or
allow them to accurately gauge his moral culpability." 28 When counsel
makes a serious error during sentencing, an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim may succeed.
2. Innocence of Predicate Conviction Claims
A distinct breed of sentencing error claim relies on the vacatur of a
predicate conviction as the basis of a claim seeking resentencing. In a sense
the claim is one of factual error, since that prior criminal conviction no
longer exists; however, the prior conviction also is no longer legally valid,
and the underlying vacatur may very well have been for either factual or
legal defects in the prior conviction. Such claims are a hybrid: the new
showing relates to a vacated predicate crime, while the relief being sought
is a resentencing to adjust the sentence to remove an enhancement based on
the now altered prior criminal record. Such claims may involve innocence
if the prior conviction was vacated in part based on evidence of innocence,
25. United States v. Manis, 344 F. App'x 160, 165 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v.
Greene, 71 F.3d 232, 235 (6th Cir. 1995)).
26. See Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 222 (2006) (holding that state court's "[flailure
to submit a sentencing factor to the jury, like failure to submit an element to the jury, is not structural
error," and therefore the error potentially could be harmless). Booker was a drug case in which the
sentencing judge gave the defendant an increased sentence based on additional facts proved beyond a
reasonable doubt at the sentencing hearing. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 227 (2005). The
Court held that the Sixth Amendment applies to federal sentencing guidelines. Id. at 226-27.
27. Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41 (2009) (per curiam). Strickland involved a defendant's
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, necessitating the defendant's conviction or sentence to be put
aside. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 671 (1984). The Court held that sentence or conviction
reversal based on ineffective assistance of counsel must establish deficient counsel resulting in
prejudice. Id. at 700.
28. Porter. 558 U.S. at 41.
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although a legal or nonfactual innocence related vacatur could have the
same effect.
For federal convicts, the Supreme Court held in Custis v. United States
that if a defendant "is successful in attacking [the defendant's] state
sentences, [the defendant] may then apply for reopening of any federal
sentence enhanced by the state sentences."29 Thus, courts more broadly
permit sentencing error challenge to claims that a predicate crime was not
committed, such as innocence of another crime that affects the sentence. If
the convict was able to have the prior conviction vacated, and can,
therefore, show factual or legal innocence of the crime for which the
enhancement was based, the inmate may then apply for resentencing,
although the Court has added the caveat that there may be procedural
barriers to doing so if the appeal is complete and postconviction motions
have already been litigated.30 The Court has added that the convict must act
diligently to obtain the state court vacatur. 31  Several courts have
characterized these as innocence claims, and have held that the actual
innocence exception to excuse procedural barriers under § 2255 applies if a
person can show innocence of predicate crimes, say, for a habitual offender
enhancement provision. 32
29. Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 497 (1994).
30. Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 382 (2001). For a list of collected cases, see generally
Bryan Florendo, Note, Prost v. Anderson and the Enigmatic Savings Clause of § 2255: When is a
Remedy by Motion "Inadequate or Ineffective"?, 89 DENV. U. L. REv. 435 (2012). The Seventh Circuit,
for example, asks whether the inmate had a prior "unobstructed procedural shot" at raising the claim. In
re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 1998). The Ninth Circuit also asks whether a petitioner had
an "unobstructed procedural shot," but asks whether there was a "material" change in the law after the
first § 2255 motion, justifying a Savings Clause exception to permit an otherwise barred habeas petition
§ 2241. Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 952, 959-60 (9th Cir. 2008). The Second Circuit interprets the
clause more generally to include: "the set of cases in which the petitioner cannot, for whatever reason,
utilize § 2255, and in which the failure to allow for collateral review would raise serious constitutional
questions." Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 377 (2d Cir. 1997).
31. Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295, 310 (2005). For examples of lower courts permitting
§ 2255 motions of this type, see United States v. Pettiford, 612 F.3d 270, 277 (4th Cir. 2010) (collecting
cases). But see id. at 278-80 (denying relief where inmate, even after vacatur of two state offenses, still
had three offenses that supported enhancement).
32. See Haley v. Cockrell, 306 F.3d 257, 264 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that exception "applies to
noncapital sentencing procedures involving a career or habitual felony offender"); Spence v.
Superintendent, Great Meadow Corr. Facility, 219 F.3d 162, 171 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that actual
innocence exception applies to claim of nonbreach of plea agreement provision); United States v.
Maybeck, 23 F.3d 888, 892-93 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding that only one prior felony conviction was
insufficient to satisfy career offender guidelines). The Fourth Circuit limits application of the actual
innocence gateway exception in the sentencing context to career or habitual offender sentences. United
States v. Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d 490, 495 (4th Cir. 1999) ("If the actual innocence exception is available
anytime a guideline is misapplied (such that the defendant is 'actually innocent' of the application of
the guideline), the actual innocence exception would swallow the rule that issues not raised on appeal
cannot be considered in a § 2255 motion absent a showing of cause and prejudice to excuse the
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Some courts of appeals do not entertain claims challenging a sentence
based on the vacatur of a prior conviction.33 Courts have struggled with
sentencing claims raising legal challenges to the interpretation of criminal
history enhancements, where doing so means applying federal definitions
of a prior sentence to prior state court practices and proceedings.34 For
example, the Third Circuit ultimately concluded in one decision that a
discontinued juvenile adjudication did not count as a prior sentence under
the federal guidelines." In contrast, suspended or probationary state
sentences have been counted as sentences.36 In rejecting consideration of
legal challenges to prior conviction-related sentence enhancements, the
Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the Supreme Court did not, in Dretke v.
Haley, answer whether innocence of sentence claims may be litigated in
noncapital cases, and assumed that "the actual-innocence exception can
apply to noncapital sentences," but required a showing that the inmate is
"factually innocent of one of the prior convictions." 37 Under that approach,
also adopted by the Fourth Circuit, a legal claim that a prior conviction
should not be counted as a predicate for an enhanced sentence would not
satisfy the miscarriage of justice exception.
Those courts emphasize the Supreme Court's language in Sawyer v.
Whitley that "the miscarriage of justice exception is concerned with actual
as compared to legal innocence,"38 and in Bousley v. United States that
"actual innocence means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency." 39
default.").
33. See Embrey v. Hershberger, 131 F.3d 739, 740 (8th Cir. 1997) ("[W]e think that Sawyer, in
terms, applies only to the sentencing phase of death cases."); United States v. Richards, 5 F.3d 1369,
1371 (10th Cir. 1993) ("A person cannot be actually innocent of a noncapital sentence . . . .").
34. For the relevant guideline, see U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4Al.2 (2012) ("If
the defendant has multiple prior sentences, determine whether those sentences are counted separately or
as a single sentence."), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2012_Guidelines/Manual_
PDF/Chapter_4.pdf.
35. United States v. Langford, 516 F.3d 205, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2008).
36. See United States v. Holland, 195 F.3d 415, 417-18 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding a suspended
sentence imposed by juvenile court to be a prior sentence); United States v. Holland, 26 F.3d 26, 28-29
(5th Cir. 1994) (same).
37. Rivers v. United States, 476 F. App'x 848, 850 (11th Cir. 2012). See also United States v.
Pettiford, 612 F.3d 270, 284 (4th Cir. 2010) ("[A]ctual innocence [of sentence exception] applies in the
context of habitual offender provisions only where the challenge to eligibility stems from factual
innocence of the predicate crimes, and not from the legal classification of the predicate crimes.").
38. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339 (1992).
39. McKay v. United States, 657 F.3d 1190, 1197 (11th Cir. 2011) (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also id at
1199 ("We thus decline to extend the actual innocence of sentence exception to claims of legal
innocence of a predicate offense justifying an enhanced sentence."); Orso v. United States, 452 F.
App'x 912, 914-15 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (applying the factual innocence standard to an actual
innocence exception), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 110 (2012).
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They highlight that the miscarriage of justice exception was designed to be
a narrow "safety valve for the extraordinary case." 40 However, the safety
valve provided in a federal court for resentencing following a federal
conviction raises far fewer concerns with finality or federalism than the
reversal of a state conviction.
Innocence can more broadly excuse procedural barriers when the
convict can show evidence of innocence of the underlying crime, rather
than the sentence, under the Court's Schlup formulation of an innocence
gateway exception. The distinction between innocence of sentence and
innocence of a crime may be fine as a practical matter, but it can decide
whether a prisoner may challenge a sentencing error or not. After all, many
distinct crimes nevertheless function as a sentencing enhancement. Thus,
prisoners convicted of "us[ing]" a firearm during a drug crime or violent
crime are in effect sentenced to an aggravated drug crime or violent crime,
although formally they are convicted under a different statute whose
elements must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.4 ' A series of prisoners
had argued their innocence after the Court narrowly defined "use" in Bailey
v. United States.42 The Court then held in Bousley that such prisoners could
retroactively litigate the issue, and could also excuse any procedural default
if they could show "actual innocence" of the crime of use of a firearm.43
The Court explained in Bousley that errors involving factual innocence of
an element of an enhanced crime might satisfy a miscarriage of justice
innocence gateway showing to excuse a procedural default.4 Although the
offense served as a sentence enhancer for the underlying drug crime or
violent crime, the claim formally involved the sufficiency of the proof for
an element of the crime, and not to the sentence.
40. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 333 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Harris v.
Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 271 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
41. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2012) (listing additional penalties for firearm use).
42. Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 149-50 (1995).
43. Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623. See also id. at 623-24 (holding in a § 2255 case that procedural
default, failure to raise a Bailey claim on appeal, could be overcome by a showing of "actual
innocence").
44. Id. at 623 ("Petitioner's claim may still be reviewed in this collateral proceeding if he can
establish that the constitutional error in his plea colloquy 'has probably resulted in the conviction of one
who is actually innocent."' (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986))). See also Lyn S.
Entzeroth, Struggling for Federal Judicial Review of Successive Claims of Innocence: A Study of How
Federal Courts Wrestled with the AEDPA to Provide Individuals Convicted of Non-Existent Crimes
with Habeas Corpus Review, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 75, 82-83 (2005) (exploring the use of § 2255 post-
AEDPA to challenge sentences based on conduct the Supreme Court later deemed not to be a crime).
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3. Factually Incorrect Calculation of Sentence
The Supreme Court. has emphasized that one way a sentence may not
be reasonable is when the judge makes an error by failing to calculate "or
improperly calculating" the guideline range.45 An outright miscalculation
can occur. One way to challenge such an error is through an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, if defense counsel simply failed to raise the
error at the time of sentencing. Showing prejudice in that circumstance,
however, may not be easy, and state and federal courts have struggled with
the question of what demonstrates prejudice, and what remedy should
result if a claim has merit. 46 On appeal, federal courts have held that errors
in calculating a sentencing range may or may not be harmless, depending
on the error and how the sentence was calculated. As the Court has held,
while the appellant has the initial burden to raise the sentencing error,
having shown that the judge sentenced based on an "invalid factor," the
government then has the burden of "persuad[ing] the court of appeals that
the district court would have imposed the same sentence absent the
erroneous factor." 47
In some situations, the error may not be harmless, even if the
erroneous range overlapped with the proper range, and even given the
district judge's discretion to depart from the result under the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines. As the Third Circuit has explained, "given the
importance of a correct guidelines calculation both to the sentencing
process that district courts are required to conduct and to our ability to
carry out reasonableness review, the use of an erroneous guidelines range
will typically require reversal." 48 However, even if the appellate court
agrees that the district judge used the wrong range, the remedy is typically
a resentencing, at which the district judge might very well impose the same
45. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
46. See David A. Perez, Note, Deal or No Deal? Remedying Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
During Plea Bargaining, 120 YALE L.J. 1532, 1541-44 (2011) (discussing the difficulties a court has in
determining prejudice).
47. Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 203 (1992).
48. United States v. Langford, 516 F.3d 205, 215 (3d Cir. 2008). See also United States v.
Hammons, 558 F.3d 1100, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding that the failure to calculate appropriate
guidelines range constituted plain error); United States v. Ramos-Paulino, 488 F.3d 459, 462-63 (1st
Cir. 2007) (finding a guidelines enhancement unwarranted in sentencing); United States v. Felton, 55
F.3d 861, 869 n.3 (3d Cir. 1995) ("This circuit and others have found that the miscalculation of a
defendant's offense level 'certainly is error that seriously affect[s] [the defendant's] rights, and so
amounts to plain error."' (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Pollen, 978 F.2d 78, 90 (3d
Cir. 1992))). Contra United States v. Rivera, 22 F.3d 430, 439 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding the sentencing
error harmless where there was overlap in the range used by the court and where the sentencing judge
made clear that the same sentence would have been imposed with the defendants' preferred range).
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sentence. 49 Moreover, post-Booker, the Supreme Court has emphasized the
broad discretion of district courts engaging in resentencing following a
postappeal remand.5 o
B. LEGAL ERRORS IN SENTENCING
1. Legal Defect in Greater Offense
A concededly guilty person may be convicted of a more serious
offense, one with an enhanced punishment, based on an incorrect
interpretation of that criminal statute. The inmate may be still properly
convicted of the lesser offense, and therefore the remedy for the vacatur of
the more serious offense is resentencing. For example, there was a rash of
litigation after the Supreme Court narrowed broad interpretations adopted
in lower courts of a provision of the Armed Career Criminal Act
("ACCA") providing for an enhanced sentence for a person who commits a
defined firearms offense and who had three previous convictions for a
"violent felony" or a "serious drug offense."5 ' Those convicts were
challenging their ACCA convictions based on the Court's interpretation of
the criminal statute under which they had been convicted, and not the
judge's application of the guidelines, and lower courts entertained those
challenges.52 Such a case falls more squarely into the category of a claim of
innocence of a criminal offense that resulted in an enhanced sentence. On
appeal, such claims may constitute a miscarriage of justice that would
satisfy the plain error doctrine, but as noted, some courts emphasize a more
restrictive case-by-case discretion to decide whether to remedy even clear
sentencing errors under the plain error doctrine.53 Regarding postconviction
49. See United States v. Conlan, 500 F.3d 1167, 1170 (10th Cir. 2007) ("[W]hat the district court
will do upon resentencing absent the illegal presumption 'places us in the zone of speculation and
conjecture."' (quoting United States v. Labastida-Segura, 396 F.3d 1140, 1143 (10th Cir. 2005)));
United States v. Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1183 (11th Cir. 2005) ("We cannot presume that, in the
absence of those errors, the district court would have decided that a downward departure was warranted
in calculating an advisory guideline range.").
50. Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1243, 1249 (2011).
51. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2012). See also Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 135 (2010)
(assessing the factor of physical force in a "violent felony"); Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 40
(2009) (defining the parameters of the Armed Career Criminal Act); Chambers v. United States, 555
U.S. 122, 130 (2009) (same); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 148 (2008) (same).
52. See Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 413-15 (7th Cir. 2010) (assessing the validity of
an ACCA challenge); United States v. Shipp, 589 F.3d 1084, 1089, 1091 (10th Cir. 2009) (same).
53. See United States v. Garcia-Gonzalez, 714 F.3d 306, 317-19 (5th Cir. 2013) (describing the
Fifth Circuit's general case-by-case approach, under which the court asks whether a case warrants the
exercise of our discretion where a potential error might result in a miscarriage of justice); United States
v. Torres-Rosario, 658 F.3d 110, 117 (1st Cir. 2011) (remanding noting the "difference in potential jail
time" under the ACCA enhancement that was incorrectly applied and finding "the threat of miscarriage
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challenges to errors in applying the ACCA, in Davis v. United States, the
Court noted such a claim involves an unlawful sentence "for an act that the
law does not make criminal."54 The Court held that there was "no room for
doubt that such a circumstance 'inherently results in a complete
miscarriage of justice' and 'present[s] exceptional circumstances' that
justify collateral relief," under the federal statute authorizing
postconviction challenges in federal criminal cases, § 2255."
2. Legally Incorrect Sentencing Enhancement Claims
Claims solely challenging sentencing enhancements have not fared
well in federal courts. On the one hand, many guidelines have language
that may be "in perfect good faith" interpreted multiple ways, as Judge
Gerard E. Lynch has described it.56 In contrast to challenges based on
statutory interpretation of criminal statutes providing for enhanced
sentences, many inmate challenges to career offender guidelines have
failed where courts hold that they are not challenging elements of the crime
itself, but rather sentencing enhancements.57 The same Supreme Court
decisions concerning the statutory meaning of the ACCA were used to
challenge the same definitional language concerning a "crime of violence"
under the "career offender" guideline enhancement, 5  resulting in lower
court rulings that the crime of violence guideline must be similarly
narrowed in its interpretation.5 9
Yet litigation under § 2255 has resulted, in prominent en banc
decisions denying relief to convicts who argued that this change rendered
their sentences incorrect. Some found the Court's decisions interpreting the
ofjustice if we declined to remand").
54. Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974).
55. Id. at 346-47 (alteration in original) (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428
(1962)).
56. Panel Discussion, Federal Sentencing Under "Advisory" Guidelines: Observations by
District Judges, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 16 (2006) (quoting Judge Gerard E. Lynch, Southern District
of New York).
57. See, e.g., McKay v. United States, 657 F.3d 1190, 1199 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that error
in treating prior conviction for carrying a concealed weapon as a "crime of violence" under the career-
offender guideline in U.S. Sentencing Guideline § 4B1.1 did not satisfy the miscarriage of justice
exception because claimed error did not allege factual innocence of underlying crime of violence).
58. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1l.2 (2012).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that based
on Begay, carrying a concealed firearm was not a crime of violence, as defined in § 4B1.2(a) for
purposes of the § 4B 1.1 career offender enhancement). Similarly, the Court narrowed the interpretation
of a "controlled substance offense" finding that mere possession did not satisfy the career offender
provision. Salinas v. United States, 547 U.S. 188, 188 (2006) (per curiam). See also Stevens v. United
States, 466 F. App'x 789, 790 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (looking favorably on Salinas but for a
procedural default in the case).
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provisions not to be retroactive. 60 Others relied on the fact that those
convicts did not raise the issue in their initial postconviction motion, and as
a result, were barred by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996 ("AEDPA"). 61 As Sarah French Russell characterized it, some of
these rulings exemplify a "reluctance to resentence." 62 Courts of appeals
have emphasized that even if the career offender guideline was applied
incorrectly, the judge could have departed upward for a range of other
reasons, or perhaps the guideline did not result in a sentence above the
otherwise applicable statutory range. 63 Appellate courts also grapple with a
real uncertainty about whether these claims involve claims of innocence-a
question that the Supreme Court declined to answer in Dretke.64 Courts
have held that "ordinary questions of guideline interpretation falling short
of the 'miscarriage of justice' standard do not present a proper [§] 2255
claim."65
3. Finality and Retroactive Guidelines Amendments
Not only is finality generally less of a concern in the sentencing
context, but also changes in U.S. Sentencing Guidelines may be made
retroactively, in contrast to newly announced rules of constitutional
criminal procedure. In Dillon v. United States, the Supreme Court held,
following language in federal statutes, that retroactive changes to
60. See Sarah French Russell, Reluctance to Resentence: Courts, Congress, and Collateral
Review, 91 N.C. L. REv. 79, 104-05 nn.158-66 (2012) (collecting decisions both finding the Court's
rulings retroactive and not).
61. See Sun Bear v. United States, 644 F.3d 700, 705 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (barring a
collateral attack to a sentence under the career offender guideline); Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d
1293, 1300 (11 th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (barring a federal habeas petition to raise a sentencing claim).
62. Russell, supra note 60, at 87.
63. See, e.g., Sun Bear, 644 F.3d at 705 ("An unlawful or illegal sentence is one imposed
without, or in excess of, statutory authority." (citing United States v. Foster, 514 F.3d 821, 824 (8th Cir.
2008); United States v. Stobaugh, 420 F.3d 796, 804 (8th Cir. 2005))); Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1304-05
(noting that judge could have enhanced sentencing by considering various § 3553(a) factors).
64. See Spence v. Superintendent, Great Meadow Corr. Facility, 219 F.3d 162, 171 (2d Cir.
2000) ("[T]here is no reason why the actual innocence exception should not apply to noncapital
sentencing procedures."). But see Embrey v. Hershberger, 131 F.3d 739, 740 (8th Cir. 1997) (en banc)
(noting that the actual innocence exception "applies only to the sentencing phase of death cases" and
not claims challenging noncapital sentencing).
65. Auman v. United States, 67 F.3d 157, 161 (8th Cir. 1995). See also Brydon v. United States,
494 F. App'x 684, 685 (8th Cir. 2012) (finding a sentence below the applicable statutory maximum,
even if based on an offense later determined not to be a crime of violence, was ordinary error); United
States v. Pregent, 190 F.3d 279, 284 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding that the denial of a motion to terminate a
term of supervised release did not meet the miscarriage of justice standard); United States v.
Williamson, 183 F.3d 458, 462 (5th Cir. 1999) (denying a collateral attack based on the miscarriage of
justice standard); Graziano v. United States, 83 F.3d 587, 590 (2d Cir. 1996) (claiming that the scope of
review on a § 2255 motion be "narrowly limited" for finality and efficiency purposes).
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sentencing guidelines could result in modified sentences. 66 Percy Dillon
had sought a reduced sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) following the
U.S. Sentencing Commission's two-level reduction for crack offenses in
2008; the judge reduced his sentence to the minimum under the new
guidelines, but did not take into account other evidence of rehabilitation
and postsentencing conduct.67 The Court interpreted § 3582 as providing
for a narrow opportunity to modify an otherwise final sentence, and the
Court emphasized notions of finality. 68 However, adopting a somewhat
different attitude toward finality in sentencing, in Freeman v. United States,
the Court upheld the power of a district judge to modify a plea agreement
entered before the retroactive reduction in the crack offense level. 69 The
plurality explained the commission's amendment helps to "isolate whatever
marginal effect the since-rejected guideline had on the defendant's
sentence," and therefore the inmate may make a motion for resentencing. 70
II. PROCEDURAL POSTURE OF SENTENCE ERROR CLAIMS
This part turns from a description of the types of sentencing error
claims to a description of the varied procedural settings in which those
claims are made.
A. ACCURACY IN SENTENCING
When approving a sentence in the typical situation in which the parties
enter a plea bargain, the judge may know very little about the facts of a
case. The hearing may be fairly brief, although the judge will be informed
by representations by the parties, information provided by a probation
officer in a Presentence Investigative Report, or perhaps another report or
examination specially requested by the judge." A plea bargain will
typically include a provision waiving any right to an appeal and collateral
remedies.72 Even in cases raising erroneous sentence claims, courts have
upheld such waivers, although courts have recognized that a claim of
innocence or potential miscarriage of justice may excuse such waivers. 7
66. Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 831 (2010).
67. Id. at 822-23.
68. Id. at 827-28.
69. Freeman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2685, 2690 (2011) (plurality opinion).
70. Id. at 2692.
71. FED. R. CRIM. P. 1l(c)(1), (3). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3552(b)-(c) (2012) (allowing a judge to
order study of additional information concerning the defendant, or a psychological or psychiatric
examination of the defendant); FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 (regarding presentence reports).
72. See Nancy J. King & Michael E. O'Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of Sentencing
Policy, 55 DUKE L.J. 209, 230-31 n.82 (2005).
73. See United States v. Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 151 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Porter, 405
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In the years prior to 1987, when the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines took
effect, the federal system was one of indeterminate sentencing, in which the
judge imposed a sentence within a statutory range, but a parole official
could later alter the length of the actual prison term. Congress abolished the
parole office and made sentences "basically determinate," which placed far
more pressure on the accuracy of sentencing.74 The guidelines seek to
provide for uniformity, or "certainty and fairness," by "avoiding
unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records
who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct," but at the same
time "maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences
when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors."75 A judge must also
consider statutory factors outside the detailed guidelines, including "the
nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics
of the defendant.""
When sentencing a defendant, the judge follows a reduced
preponderance of the evidence standard of proof. Without adopting such a
standard, in 1991, the commission added a recommendation in commentary
that judges use a preponderance of the evidence standard at sentencing "to
meet due process requirements."77 Putting to one side the question whether
the commission has the authority to recommend a constitutional standard,
the Supreme Court tacitly endorsed such a standard pre-Booker." What
evidence may be considered during sentencing? The federal guidelines
preserved the preexisting statute providing factual disputes concerning
sentencing may be resolved by evidence "without regard to its admissibility
under the rules of evidence applicable at trial," but adding that the evidence
must have a "sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable
F.3d 1136, 1145 (10th Cir. 2005); Bender v. United States, No. Il-CV-2004, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
56457, at *4-5 (C.D. Ill. May 26, 2011); Russell, supra note 60, at 124.
74. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 367 (1989).
75. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (2012).
76. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).
77. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6Al.3 cmt. background (2012) (emphasis
omitted) ("The [c]ommission believes that use of a preponderance of the evidence standard is
appropriate to meet due process requirements and policy concerns in resolving disputes regarding
application of the guidelines to the facts of a case." (emphasis omitted)), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2012_Guidelines/ManualPDF/Chapter6.pdf.
78. Cf Edwards v. United States, 523 U.S. 511, 513-14 (1998) (noting that the defendant's
constitutional argument would not change the Court's decision because the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
dictate otherwise); United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997) (per curiam) (same); Deborah
Young, The Freedom to Sentence: District Courts After Booker, 37 MCGEORGE L. REv. 649, 664-70




accuracy."" In that latter respect, the guidelines did improve on the
previous standard, which required only "minimal indici[a] of reliability."s 0
The guidelines commentary notes "[r]eliable hearsay evidence may be
considered" but not "[u]nreliable allegations," without defining what
reliability means during sentencing.s' Critics such as Deborah Young have
argued the Federal Rules of Evidence should apply at sentencing, due to
accuracy concerns.82 But the Court has long emphasized that a wide range
of information may be considered during sentencing, including acquitted
conduct. The Court's classic articulation of this principle was in Williams v.
New York, a 1949 death penalty case. The Court emphasized that unlike at
trial, in which rules of evidence carefully confine admissible evidence, at
sentencing a judge must be liberated to consider "the fullest information
possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics," without "rigid
adherence to restrictive rules of evidence properly applicable to the trial."83
B. SENTENCING ERROR UNDER ADVISORY SENTENCING GUIDELINES
The Apprendi v. New Jersey line of cases is not about accuracy, but
rather enhancing the factfinding role of the jury.84 The Court's decisions
79. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3(a). See also id. § 1B1.4 ("In determining
the sentence to impose within the guideline range, or whether a departure from the guidelines is
warranted, the court may consider, without limitation, any information concerning the background,
character[,] and conduct of the defendant, unless otherwise prohibited by law."); 18 U.S.C. § 3661 ("No
limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a
person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the
purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence."); FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(3) (providing that the court must
resolve disputed matters at sentencing).
80. United States v. Miele, 989 F.2d 659, 663-64 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v.
Baylin, 696 F.2d 1030, 1040 (3d Cir. 1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
81. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6Al.3 cmt. background (emphasis omitted)
(citations omitted).
82. Deborah Young, Fact-Finding at Federal Sentencing: Why the Guidelines Should Meet the
Rules, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 299, 302-03 (1994).
83. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949). The Court noted in Dretke that it had not
extended the In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), requirement that a beyond a reasonable doubt
standard apply to proof of each element of a crime, "to proof of prior convictions used to support
recidivist enhancements," or the timing of prior convictions used to calculate a recidivist enhancement,
and called these "difficult constitutional questions." Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 395-96 (2004).
84. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) ("Other than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."); Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 167
(2009) ("The Federal Constitution's jury-trial guarantee assigns the determination of certain facts to the
jury's exclusive province."); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313 (2004) ("There is not one shred
of doubt, however, about the Framers' paradigm for criminal justice: not the civil-law ideal of
administrative perfection, but the common-law ideal of limited state power accomplished by strict
division of authority between judge and jury."); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) ("The right
to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment would be senselessly diminished if it encompassed
2014] 517
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
hold that facts, other than a prior conviction, that enhance a sentence
beyond the statutory minimum or maximum, and not admitted by the
defendant, must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury.15 The
Apprendi cases do not address the concerns of critics who complain that lax
treatment of sentencing burdens of proof and admissibility of hearsay or
uncharged crimes permits a range of potential errors.8 1 One federal judge
described the principle of proof applied at sentencing as "[a]nything
[g]oes."87
The Supreme Court in Booker rendered the guidelines advisory, and
also added a new layer of "reasonableness" review by appellate judges,
supplementing the preexisting appeal standard (discussed below). The
Booker remedy may have powerful effects by liberating judges from
constraints of the guidelines,89 including perhaps by encouraging the U.S.
Sentencing Commission and Congress to improve on the guidelines. The
Booker remedy, however, does not squarely address the accuracy
problem.90 While sentencing has become more discretionary, it is not
purely indeterminate as before the guidelines, and factfinding continues to
result in potentially identifiable increases in sentences. The Booker
decision did not alter the use of relevant conduct and other uncharged
evidence related to the "real offense" as part of sentencing.9' Thus, as
courts of appeals have held, acquitted conduct can still form the basis for
the factfinding necessary to increase a defendant's sentence by two years, but not the factfinding
necessary to put him to death."); Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 245 (1999) ("[T]here is reason to
suppose that in the present circumstances, however peculiar their details to our time and place, the
relative diminution ofthe jury's significance would merit Sixth Amendment concern.").
85. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483-84, 490. See also Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2158
(2013) (plurality opinion) ("The touchstone for determining whether a fact must be found by a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt is whether the fact constitutes an element or ingredient of the charged
offense." (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
86. See Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2158; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490; Margaret A. Berger, Rethinking
the Applicability of Evidentiary Rules at Sentencing: Of Relevant Conduct and Hearsay and the Need
for an Infield Fly Rule, 5 FED. SENT'G REP. 96, 96 (1992) ("[T]he sentencing guidelines have rarely
been critiqued from an evidentiary vantage point.").
87. United States v. Smiley, 997 F.2d 475, 483 (8th Cir. 1993) (Bright, J., dissenting) (footnote
omitted) (citation omitted).
88. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 263, 266 (2005). See also Rita v. United States, 551
U.S. 338, 347 (2007) (concluding that appellate courts can presume that a sentence is reasonable).
89. Amy Baron-Evans & Kate Stith, Booker Rules, 160 U. PA. L. REv. 1631, 1690 (2012).
90. For a detailed exploration of the due process concern with factfinding at sentencing, see
generally Susan N. Herman, The Tail That Wagged the Dog: Bifircated Fact-Finding Under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Limits ofDue Process, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 289 (1992); Stephen
J. Schulhofer, Due Process ofSentencing, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 733 (1980).
91. Cf H.R. REP. No.98-1017, at 98 (1984) (expressing concerns regarding the constitutionality
of real offense sentencing).
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an increased sentence, even where the jury plainly rejected those facts. 92
Prosecutors may have significant influence on relevant conduct brought
before the judge, or what drug amounts or amount of loss is charged, or
whether motions are brought for career offenders or substantial
assistance.93 The guidelines continue to recommend "[r]eliable hearsay
evidence may be considered" but not "[u]nreliable allegations," without
defining what reliability means. 94
This uncertainty affects claims of sentencing errors. Post-Booker,
courts have struggled with how to identify cognizable sentencing errors
under the new reasonableness standard of review. Some courts have
adopted far more deferential standards than others. Moreover, very few
criminal cases go to a trial. Perhaps in cases that do go to trial, prosecutors
may have good reasons to put before the jury evidence that would enhance
a sentence, even if they are not required to do so post-Apprendi. The
accuracy of jury factfinding related to sentencing raises still additional
questions. In contrast, plea bargaining can involve fact bargaining about
what facts justify the sentence.95 This may also have, as Stephanos Bibas
has argued, perverse consequences of treating more fact-bound questions as
"elements" of crimes that are agreed on in plea bargains, rather than tested
at a sentencing hearing.96 Post-Booker, courts still permit binding plea
agreements, which include a sentencing range as part of its terms, under
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 11 (c)(1)(C), but emphasize that
judges continue to have discretion to reject plea agreements that are
involuntary and unfair.97
92. United States v. White, 551 F.3d 381, 382 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
93. See 21 U.S.C. § 851 (2012) (discussing the proceedings that establish a defendant's prior
convictions); Statement of Judge Robert L. Hinkle, Federal District Judge, before the United States
Sentencing Commission (Feb. 11, 2009),
http://www.ussc.gov/LegislativeandPublicAffairs/PublicHearingsandMeetings/200902 10-
1 1/Hinklestatement.pdf.
94. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6Al.3 cmt. background (2012) (emphasis
omitted) (citations omitted).
95. William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law's Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV.
L. REv. 2548, 2559-60 (2004) ("[W]hen necessary, the litigants simply bargain about what facts will
(and [will not]) form the basis for sentencing. It seems to be an iron rule: guidelines sentencing
empowers prosecutors, even where the guidelines' authors try to fight that tendency." (footnote
omitted) (citations omitted)).
96. Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty
Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1101 (2001).
97. See United States v. Kling, 516 F.3d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 2008) ("Booker, however, did not
address the sentencing discretion of the district court in accepting Rule I1 (c)(1)(C) agreements. Courts
are not obligated to accept plea agreements and have discretion to reject those which are deemed
involuntary or unfair." (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (b)(2))); Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Walker, 261
F.3d 370, 374-75 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding that the appellate court did not err in vacating the defendant's
2014] 519
520 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:499
C. APPEALS AND PLAIN ERROR REVIEW
Federal district judges have limited ability to correct a sentence,
absent "clear error" detected within 14 days of sentencing.98 However, the
adoption of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines also brought appellate review
of sentences. Congress enacted a statute providing for an appeal of a
sentence that "was imposed in violation of law," "as a result of an incorrect
application of the sentencing guidelines," or in excess of the "applicable
guidelines range."99 On appeal, any error in sentencing could be found
harmless, or if not preserved by a contemporaneous objection at trial or at
sentencing, the error could be found not to be a plain error. 100 The plain
error doctrine raised uncertainties, since the statutory language that an
unpreserved error may be raised if it affects "substantial rights" is not
entirely clear.1 'o The Supreme Court added the gloss that such an error is
one that "seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings."' 02 Such a standard is not necessarily innocence-
related, but the Court has long connected the standard with the concept of a
miscarriage of justice, although noting that the remedy is not "only
warranted in cases of actual innocence."l 03 (Indeed, the Court has held
there was no reason to import the "more vague" plain error standard in the
context of the habeas corpus miscarriage of justice exception to procedural
defaults.104) Some lower courts, however, have used problematic language
sentence based on finding that the judge punished the defendant for not accepting a plea deal); Scott D.
Hammond, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen. Criminal Enforcement, U.S. Dep't of Justice, The U.S. Model
of Negotiated Plea Agreements: A Good Deal with Benefits for All, Address at the OECD Competition
Committee Working Party No. 3, at 8 (Oct. 17, 2006),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/219332.pdf (noting the U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust
Division's "near perfect track record in persuading courts to accept negotiated 'C' agreements.").
98. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35.
99. 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2012). That provision was added by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 212, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987 (1984). Prior to that addition, Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 35 permitted the sentencing judge to correct an error at "any time." United States v.
Ellenbogen, 390 F.2d 537, 543 (2d Cir. 1968) (Rule 35 gave "every convicted defendant a second round
before the sentencing judge" and afford "the judge an opportunity to reconsider the sentence in ... light
of any fiirther information about the defendant or the case which may have been presented to him in the
interim").
100. FED. R. CRIM. P. 51-52.
101. Id 52.
102. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997) (alteration in original) (quoting
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)).
103. Olano, 507 U.S. at 736. See also United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 633 (2002)
(emphasizing "overwhelming" evidence supporting sentence, and therefore finding error not
substantial); Johnson, 520 U.S. at 469 ("No 'miscarriage of justice' will result here if we do not notice
the error." (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 736)); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 (1982) ("Rule
52(b) was intended to afford a means for the prompt redress of miscarriages ofjustice.").
104. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 136 (1982).
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suggesting something stricter than the typical miscarriage of justice
standard, which under Schlup requires that more likely than not no
reasonable factfinder would convict or reach the same sentence; those
courts instead cite a "manifest miscarriage of justice" standard and insist
that the record be "devoid of evidence pointing to guilt."o 5
That appellate standard for challenging sentences has been supplanted
by the Court's decision in Booker and subsequent rulings developing a new
reasonableness standard for appellate review of sentencing, although the
Booker Court emphasized that the traditional plain error test still applies.' 06
Those changes, as discussed, do not fully diminish the accuracy concern
with factfinding during sentencing, and questions about what constitutes a
miscarriage of justice in that setting continue to be important. Some courts
have applied a more relaxed version of plain error review post-Booker
because "the cost of correcting a sentencing error is far less than the cost of
a retrial."10 7 As Judge Jon 0. Newman, writing for the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals, explained:
A resentencing is a brief event, normally taking less than a day and
requiring the attendance of only the defendant, counsel, and court
personnel. Equally important, review of a sentencing error, unlike a trial
error, does not require the appellate court to make its estimate of whether
it thinks the outcome would have been non-trivially different had the
error not occurred. 08
Other courts, as will be described in detail below, adopt far more
constrained views of what sentencing errors should be cognizable on
appeal under traditional appellate standards,109  and post-Booker
reasonableness review, as well as postconviction.
105. United States v. Castro, 704 F.3d 125, 138 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Green,
293 F.3d 886, 895 (5th Cir. 2002)). See also id. at 137-38 (citing cases).
106. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 268 (2005). For more information on reasonableness
review, see generally Toby J. Heytens, Essay, The Framework(s) of Legal Change, 97 CORNELL L.
REV. 595, 607 (2012), and Nancy J. King, Essay, Reasonableness Review After Booker, 43 Hous. L.
REv. 325 (2006).
107. United States v. Williams, 399 F.3d 450, 456 (2d Cir. 2005). See also id at 457 ("[T]he
Supreme Court has never applied the Olano formulation of the plain error doctrine to ignore a judge's
sentencing error that affected substantial rights, nor required a court of appeals to do so.").
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., United States v. Ellis, 564 F.3d 307, 378-79 (5th Cir. 2009) ("[E]ven if an increase
in a sentence [is] seen as inevitably 'substantial' . . . it does not inevitably affect the fairness, integrity,
or public reputation of judicial process and proceedings."); United States v. Rodriguez, 406 F.3d 1261,
1281 (11th Cir. 2005) (rejecting the approach of the Second, D.C., and Seventh Circuits to plain error
post-Booker, and noting that "[b]roadening that exception, or constructing ways to circumvent its
restrictions on an issue-by-issue basis, lessens the effect of the rule and undermines the interests it
serves.").
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D. WAIVERS AND THE MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE EXCEPTION
Plea agreements commonly include provisions waiving the right to an
appeal or postconviction review. Courts of appeals adopt a miscarriage of
justice standard for excusing such waivers, linking refusal to enforce an
appeal or postconviction waiver to a claim of innocence. What do courts
mean by a miscarriage of justice in that context? Courts are conflicted.
Several courts of appeals have held that sentences may be a miscarriage of
justice, such that an appellate waiver should not be honored, if the sentence
is unlawful because it is in excess of the maximum penalty provided by
law. "o Other courts of appeals also refuse to enforce the waiver if the
agreement waives the right to appeal a sentence, not agreed on, but that a
judge later determines is applicable.1"' Other courts have declined to
identify what errors would be severe enough, but noting factors, such as the
"clarity of the error, its gravity, [and] its character," "whether it concerns a
fact issue," and its "impact." 1 2 Courts have also held waivers are invalid if
110. See, e.g., United States v. Salas-Garcia, 698 F.3d 1242, 1255 (10th Cir. 2012) (describing
miscarriage of justice exception, and noting one situation included is "where the sentence exceeds the
statutory [maximum]" (quoting United States v. Elliott, 264 F.3d 1171, 1173 (10th Cir. 2001))); United
States v. Guillen, 561 F.3d 527, 532 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ("[W]e will disregard a waiver agreement on
account of a district court's procedural error only if the error results in a miscarriage of justice.");
United States v. Lockwood, 416 F.3d 604, 608 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that waivers are not enforced if
they involved "sentences based on constitutionally impermissible criteria (such as race), sentences
exceeding the statutory maximum, or ineffective assistance of counsel."); United States v. Andis, 333
F.3d 886, 891 (8th Cit. 2003) (en banc) ("Although we have not provided an exhaustive list of the
circumstances that might constitute a miscarriage of justice, we recognize that these waivers are
contractual agreements between a defendant and the Government and should not be easily voided by the
courts. As such, we caution that this exception is a narrow one and will not be allowed to swallow the
general rule that waivers of appellate rights are valid.").
111. See United States v. Goodman, 165 F.3d 169, 174-75 (2d Cir. 1999) (refusing to enforce a
plea agreement with waiver of right to appeal any sentence imposed if within the statutory maximum);
United States v. Attar, 38 F.3d 727, 731 (4th Cir. 1994) ("In this circuit, a waiver-of-appeal-rights
provision in a valid plea agreement is enforceable against the defendant so long as it is 'the result of a
knowing and intelligent decision to forgo the right to appeal."' (quoting United States v. Wessells, 936
F.2d 165, 167 (4th Cir. 1991))). But see United States v. Montano, 472 F.3d 1202, 1205 (10th Cir.
2007) ("[I]n this Circuit we have consistently and repeatedly held that broad waivers are enforceable
even where they are not contingent on the ultimate sentence falling within an identified sentencing
range."); United States v. Williams, 184 F.3d 666, 671 (7th Cir. 1999) (declining to adopt Goodman);
United States v. Atterberry, 144 F.3d 1299, 1300 (10th Cir. 1998) ("This court will hold a defendant to
the terms of a lawful plea agreement."); United States v. Rosa, 123 F.3d 94, 97-102 (2d Cir. 1997)
("We have stated that '[i]n no circumstance ... may a defendant, who has secured the benefits of a plea
agreement and knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to appeal a certain sentence, then appeal the
merits of a sentence conforming to the agreement. Such a remedy would render the plea bargaining
process in the resulting agreement meaningless."' (alteration and ellipses in original) (quoting United
States v. Salcido-Contreras, 990 F.2d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1993))).
112. United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 563 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Teeter,
257 F.3d 14, 25-26 (1st Cir. 2001)). See also id. at 562-63 (surveying caselaw instead of earmarking
situations that would constitute a miscarriage of justice); United States v. Castro, 704 F.3d 125, 136 (3d
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based on a constitutionally impermissible factor, such as race, or
ineffective assistance of counsel.1 13
Still additional courts have noted that since sentencing offers
discretion to trial judges, "the same flexibility ought to pertain when the
district court plainly errs in sentencing." 1l4 As the First Circuit explained,
in this context, "the term 'miscarriage of justice' is more a concept than a
constant.""' 5 However, any such remedy is "strong medicine," reserved for
unusual cases, and post-Booker, not only have courts of appeals upheld
waivers of a right to advisory sentencing, but also courts have held that
"supposed misapprehension of the advisory nature of the sentencing
guidelines," does not constitute a miscarriage of justice." 6
The emerging miscarriage of justice law concerning appeals waivers
implicates a combination of concerns with knowing and voluntary plea
bargains, sentencing errors, access to appellate and postconviction
remedies, effectiveness of counsel, and the power of prosecutors.
Innocence plays a role in the analysis, and the exception is framed as an
equitable miscarriage of justice exception. But as with the areas discussed
next, innocence or error in sentencing is linked to other fairness concerns.
Importantly, however, federal courts of appeals also highlight how
although the type of error, such as a sentence in excess of a maximum
otherwise applicable, may be the product of discretion and not relevant to
guilt or innocence of the underlying crime, finality is also less of a concern.
Resentencing is not burdensome to conduct, and if the judge errs, there
Cir. 2013) (citing the Teeter factors listed in Khattak for determining miscarriage of justice based on
waiver); United States v. Jennings, 662 F.3d 988, 991 (8th Cir. 2011) ("Although we have not provided
an exhaustive list of the circumstances that might constitute a miscarriage of justice, we have
recognized that a waiver of appellate rights does not prohibit the appeal of an illegal sentence, a
sentence in violation of the terms of an agreement, and a claim asserting ineffective assistance of
counsel." (citing Andis, 333 F.3d at 891)); Teeter, 257 F.3d at 25-26 ("[I]f denying a right of appeal
would work a miscarriage ofjustice, the appellate court, in its sound discretion, may refuse to honor the
waiver.").
113. See United States v. Brown, 232 F.3d 399, 403-04 (4th Cir. 2000) (nonconformance with
sentencing guidelines); United States v. Schmidt, 47 F.3d 188, 190 (7th Cir. 1995) (race). Several courts
adopt a test focusing on four "situations" constituting a miscarriage of justice: "[(I)] where the district
court relied on an impermissible factor such as race, [(2)] where ineffective assistance of counsel in
connection with the negotiation of the waiver renders the waiver invalid, [(3)] where the sentence
exceeds the statutory maximum, or [(4)] where the waiver is otherwise unlawful." United States v.
Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1327 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Elliott, 264 F.3d 1171,
1173 (10th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
114. Teeter, 257 F.3d at 25.
115. Id at 26.
116. United States v. Chambers, 710 F.3d 23, 31 (1st Cir. 2013). See also United States v.
Magouirk, 468 F.3d 943, 951 (6th Cir. 2006) (upholding a Booker waiver).
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should be "the same flexibility" in correcting that error on appeal.117 I
argue that the same flexibility should animate approaches to types of
sentencing errors discussed in the next section.
E. SECTION 2255 AND HABEAS CHALLENGES TO SENTENCING ERRORS
In 1948, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a statute creating
substitute procedures for habeas review, in order to require that
applications be more conveniently filed in the court where the prisoner was
originally convicted, and not where they were being held in custody. 18
Unlike § 2254, which provides for federal habeas review of state
convictions, § 2255 provides that the inmate "may move the court which
imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside[,] or correct the sentence."' The
AEDPA also introduced a one year statute of limitations for federal
prisoners seeking relief under § 2255, with limited exceptions, including
subsequent discovery of a new "fact[]" or ability to take retroactive
advantage of a new "right" recognized by the Supreme Court.120 Despite
the broad language of § 2255, which permits motions based on sentencing
errors, the Supreme Court in Hill v. United States noted that
nonconstitutional errors typically cannot be corrected using § 2255, where
the error was not a "fundamental defect" that would "inherently" result in a
"miscarriage of justice."l 21 That ruling has made the question whether a
sentencing error is also a claim of innocence highly relevant to the
procedural ability of a federal court to remedy a sentencing error. However,
the Court did not claim to define in Hill, or in subsequent cases, what types
of sentencing errors might constitute a miscarriage of justice.
The same miscarriage of justice rule should apply in the context of
federal habeas corpus § 2254 challenges to state convictions. However, the
117. Teeter, 257 F.3d at 25.
118. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 219 (1952) ("[T]he sole purpose was to minimize
the difficulties. . . by affording the same rights in another and more convenient forum.").
119. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2012).
120. Id. § 2255(f (noting that the statute of limitations creates an exception for a "right" that was
"newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral
review"). A vacatur of a state court conviction on which the federal sentence was based, constitutes a
new "fact" under the AEDPA statute of limitations. Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295, 307 (2005).
However, the Supreme Court does not always make new sentencing legislation, much less rulings, fully
retroactive. Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2335 (2012) ("[I]n federal sentencing the ordinary
practice is to apply new penalties to defendants not yet sentenced, while withholding that change from
defendants already sentenced.").
121. Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962). See also United States v. Addonizio, 442
U.S. 178, 185 (1979) (repeating that a nonconstitutional error of law generally can form the basis for
§ 2255 relief only if the error constitutes a "fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete
miscarriage ofjustice" (quoting Hill, 368 U.S. at 428) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Court has not reached the issue, having declined in Dretke to address
whether the actual innocence of sentence gateway exception to procedural
default doctrines applies in a noncapital case under § 2254, for a challenge
to a state court conviction.122 As a result, what innocence means in the
sentencing context remains particularly unsettled in § 2254 litigation. In
cases involving federal convicts, questions remain regarding what should
count as a miscarriage of justice under § 2255, particularly given the
additional post-Booker sentencing discretion of the judge, with deferential
and totality of the circumstances reasonableness review by appellate
courts. 123
Federal habeas cases brought using § 2254 permit a range of
procedural barriers to habeas corpus relief to be excused if the convict can
make a gateway showing of possible innocence. These miscarriage of
justice exceptions to otherwise applicable procedural barriers include one
recognized doctrine concerning sentencing. In Sawyer, the Court held that a
death row inmate may obtain gateway relief, permitting consideration of an
underlying constitutional claim despite procedural barriers that would
otherwise apply, by making a showing of actual innocence of a capital
sentence.124 That standard permits only relief from certain (and not all)
procedural bars,' 25 and it is not a forgiving standard. A movant "must show
by clear and convincing evidence that, but for a constitutional error, no
reasonable juror would have found the petitioner eligible for the death
penalty under the applicable state law."' 26 Where the applicable state
122. Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393-94 (2004) ("[A] federal court faced with allegations of
actual innocence, whether of the sentence or of the crime charged, must first address all nondefaulted
claims for comparable relief and other grounds for cause to excuse the procedural default.").
123. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (Appellate courts should "take into account the
totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the [g]uidelines [r]ange"). For
criticisms of the open ended quality of that standard of review, see D. Michael Fisher, Still in Balance?
Federal District Court Discretion and Appellate Review Six Years After Booker, 49 DUQ. L. REV. 641,
652 (2011) ("The confusion over what reasonableness means ... has led the courts of appeals to take an
ad hoc approach to sentencing review.. . ."); Nancy Gertner, Essay, On Competence, Legitimacy, and
Proportionality, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1585, 1586 (2012) (stating the theme of "the federal appeals courts'
inability to give meaning to substantive reasonableness sentencing review."); Carissa Byrne Hessick &
F. Andrew Hessick, Appellate Review of Sentencing Decisions, 60 ALA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2008)
("[C]onfusion remains regarding appellate review of sentencing decisions.").
124. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 336 (1992).
125. The AEDPA contains language at the same time apparently cribbed in part from Sawyer, but
also arguably inconsistent with Sawyer claims, both in sections dealing with evidentiary hearings and
second or successive federal habeas petitions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (discussing the finality of
determinations). As a result, courts have divided in their treatment of such claims. For a discussion of
this problem, see BRANDON L. GARRETT & LEE KOVARSKY, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPus: EXECUTIVE
DETENTION AND POST-CONVICTION LITIGATION 263 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 2013).
126. Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 336.
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standards for death eligibility may be multifactored and flexible, the
Sawyer standard is not easy to satisfy.
Gateway claims of innocence of a noncapital sentence hang in limbo.
The miscarriage of justice doctrines had origins in pre-1996 federal statutes
regarding excusing subsequent habeas applications if the "ends of justice"
supported doing so (and indeed, the miscarriage of justice standard drew
from an early decision that was a § 2255 case involving a federal convict,
but emphasizing that the same standard should apply in § 2254 cases
involving state convicts). 127 Despite the Court's emphasis in 2006 that a
judge conduct a "holistic" inquiry into whether new evidence of innocence
justifies excusing otherwise applicable procedural defaults, 128 the Court has
not reached the question whether a claimed error in a noncapital sentence
can be a claim of innocence that implicates the miscarriage of justice
exception permitting procedural barriers to be excused postconviction. The
Court did suggest in Smith v. Murray that the focus of the miscarriage of
justice exception was not on the "nature of the penalty" 29 but rather on
"any substantial claim that the alleged error undermined the accuracy of the
guilt or sentencing determination." 3 0 There, the focus was on capital trials
and whether a constitutional violation caused an actual error in determining
guilt or eligibility for sentence, by "preclud[ing] the development of true
facts [or] result[ing] in the admission of false ones."' 31 However, as noted,
in Dretke, the Court declined to address whether the actual innocence of
sentence gateway exception to procedural barriers applies in a noncapital
case. 132 Nevertheless, as I will develop, a range of innocence of sentence
claims can be litigated, and have been endorsed by the Supreme Court.
127. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 495 (1991). See also id. ("Sanders [v. United States] drew
the phrase 'ends of justice' from the 1948 version of § 2244.... ([The] judge need not entertain
subsequent application if he is satisfied that the ends of justice will not be served by such inquiry)."
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 15 (1963)
("Since the motion procedure is the substantial equivalent of federal habeas corpus, we see no need to
differentiate the two for present purposes.").
128. House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 539 (2006). However, AEDPA has supplanted the miscarriage
ofjustice exception for second or successive petitions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).
129. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 538 (1986).
130. Id at 539 (emphasis added). See also Spence v. Superintendent, Great Meadow Corr.
Facility, 219 F.3d 162, 170-71 (2d Cir. 2000) ("When transporting the concept of actual innocence to
the sentencing phase of capital trials, the Supreme Court has required that the legal error the defendant
raises (his constitutional claim) must have caused an actual error in determining guilt or eligibility for
sentence. . . ." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
131. Smith, 477 U.S. at 538.
132. Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393-94 (2004) ("[A] federal court faced with allegations of
actual innocence, whether of the sentence or of the crime charged, must first address all nondefaulted
claims for comparable relief and other grounds for cause to excuse the procedural default.").
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Where the Supreme Court has not yet reached the question under
§ 2254, and has not provided clear guidance as to what constitutes a
miscarriage of justice under § 2255, lower courts have had to struggle in
§ 2255 cases with what raises something out of the "ordinary," making it a
cognizable error of law, or the type of error that fits within the miscarriage
of justice exception permitting § 2255 relief. As the Tenth Circuit
described it in 1998, "very few cases have had any occasion to determine
which sentencing errors are 'fundamental' and therefore correctable under
§ 2255, and which are not."l 33 There has been more development in the
caselaw in the years since, but the caselaw is highly confused, with divided
rulings and splits in the circuits. Courts of appeals, even those that more
narrowly interpret the miscarriage of justice exception for § 2255, permit
claims challenging guidelines application errors in which the alleged error
resulted in a sentence above the statutory maximum, in the context of the
career offender or other habitual offender guideline provisions. 134 The
Eighth Circuit emphasized in a divided en banc decision that a challenge to
an erroneous career offender sentence was not cognizable under § 2255,
agreeing that "[a]n unlawful or illegal sentence is one imposed without, or
in excess of, statutory authority,"' 35 and such an error would be cognizable,
but in contrast, a "misapplication of the [U.S.] Sentencing Guidelines" is
not cognizable."' The dissent retorted that a serious sentencing error
constitutes a miscarriage of justice, and called the majority approach
"nothing more than a judicial 'gotcha."" 3 7
In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit emphasized, in a case raising the
career offender guideline, that the error was "not ordinary [gluideline
error,"1 38 and that "a sentencing error like the one here can amount to a
fundamental defect that inherently creates a complete miscarriage of
justice." 39 The Court noted the costs of such errors to the U.S. Treasury
alone: "[E]rroneously labeling [petitioner] a career offender results in an
133. United States v. Talk, 158 F.3d 1064, 1070 (10th Cir. 1998), abrogated by United States v.
Harms, 371 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004). For an excellent overview of caselaw concerning post-Bailey
litigation under § 2255, see Entzeroth, supra note 44, at 93-102.
134. See Haley v. Cockrell, 306 F.3d 257, 266 (5th Cir. 2002) ("[T]he granting of habeas relief is
appropriate where the State has failed to produce sufficient evidence of the petitioner's habitual
offender status."); United States v. Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d 490, 494-95 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing cases).
135. Sun Bear v. United States, 644 F.3d 700, 705 (8th Cir. 2011).
136. Id. at 704. See also id. at 704-05 (analogizing to the appellate waiver miscarriage of justice
exception context).
137. Id at 707 (Melloy, J., dissenting) (quoting Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293, 1336
(1 Ith Cir. 2011) (en banc) (Hill, J., dissenting)).
138. Spencer v. United States, 727 F.3d 1076, 1091 (11th Cir. 2013), reh'g en banc granted,
opinion vacated, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 4315.
139. Id. at 1088.
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annual taxpayer outlay of $28,893.40 for an extra 6 1/4 years. We do not
know how many instances there are of defendants like [the petitioner]."l40
Such rulings extend the concept of an innocence of sentence claim from a
vacated underlying conviction, to sentences above a statutory maximum,
and then to the harm identified by the Court in the Apprendi line of
decisions: the harm of erroneously sentencing an inmate to a punishment
that exceeds the otherwise applicable maximum. Nevertheless, courts
remain reluctant to permit § 2255 challenges to "ordinary" or "run-of-the-
mill" guidelines errors. Whether courts will rule similarly regarding facts
that increase a mandatory minimum sentence, contrary to the Court's ruling
in Alleyne v. United States, remains to be seen.' 4' Lower courts should
heed the command of the Court post-Booker to extend reasonableness
review to sentences, whether imposed within or without the guidelines.
With appellate review broadly extending to the reasonableness of
sentences, limiting the miscarriage of justice exception to certain narrowly
defined situations seems far less supported.
The Seventh Circuit permitted a § 2255 challenge to a career offender
criminal enhancement,142 and in an en banc ruling concluded the Supreme
Court's interpretation should be applied retroactively, since it resulted in a
sentence that "exceeds that permitted by law and constitutes a miscarriage
of justice."' 43 However, the Seventh Circuit has since backed away from its
ruling in Narvaez v. United States and in its 2013 en banc decision in
Hawkins v. United States held that "now that the guidelines, including the
career offender guideline . .. are merely advisory" there may be no error
and a sentence would be reasonable with or without a career offender
enhancement.144 After all, in an advisory guidelines world, the judge might
make a "mistake" in sentencing a convict, but the error would not be
cognizable since the mistake relates to discretion, and is no longer a
question of a sentence not authorized by law, but rather a question of
"erroneous interpretation of the guidelines."' 45 The bottom line: "An error
140. Id. at 1091.
141. See Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2153 (2013) (plurality opinion) (finding a
Sixth Amendment violation of the defendant's rights during sentencing); Woods v. Coakley, No. 4:13
CV 1388, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101990, at *11 (N.D. Ohio July 22, 2013) ("Contrary to [the
defendant]'s suggestion, however, Alleyne does not support his actual innocence claim because that
decision is not an intervening change in the law that decriminalized the acts that form the basis of his
conviction.").
142. Narvaez v. United States, 641 F.3d 877, 878 (7th Cir. 2011).
143. Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621, 623 (7th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
144. Hawkins v. United States, 706 F.3d 820, 822-23 (7th Cir. 2013).
145. Id at 823.
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in the interpretation of a merely advisory guideline is less serious."' 46 The
Seventh Circuit denied rehearing in Hawkins with a dissenter noting that
"the Supreme Court has never set forth a per se rule that a sentencing error
could never rise to the level of a miscarriage of justice." 147
Questions of interpretation of merely advisory guidelines may have a
dramatic impact on convicts. For example, a drug sentence may be many
orders of magnitude larger depending on whether the drug quantity is based
on the amount of drugs found on the defendant's person and property at the
time of arrest, or the total amount of drugs allegedly sold over many
years.' 48 Questions of interpretation of what counts as the intended loss to
victims in a fraud scheme have divided lower courts, but will continue to
provide a starting place for sentencing and account for vast differences in
possible sentences.' 49 For that reason, the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with
the Seventh and Eighth Circuits and emphasized how the Supreme Court
has said post-Booker that sentencing decisions continue to be very much
"anchored" by the guidelines. 150
Appellate courts also discuss finality and floodgates concerns. As the
Fourth Circuit characterized it, if the actual innocence gateway "is
available anytime a guideline is misapplied [then] . .. the actual innocence
exception would swallow the rule that issues not raised on appeal cannot be
considered in a § 2255 motion absent a showing of cause and prejudice to
excuse the default."1 s' In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit stated, "we
acknowledge the perennial concern about the justice system's need for
finality," but noted that
as for manageability, as commentators have observed, collateral reviews
of sentencing cases deal generally only with paper records, and they
usually return to the same judge who sentenced the defendant initially.
No trial or sentencing judge likes to repeat what he or she has done
before, but those factors assuage the burden.152
146. Id. at 824.
147. Hawkins v. United States, 724 F.3d 915, 921-22 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J, dissenting from
the denial of rehearing).
148. See United States v. Quinn, 472 F. Supp. 2d 104, 105-09 (D. Mass. 2007) (describing the
defendant's drug offense and corresponding U.S. Sentencing Guidelines).
149. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 (2012).
150. Spencer v. United States, 727 F.3d 1076, 1088 (11th Cir. 2013) (emphasis omitted), reh'g en
banc granted, opinion vacated, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 4315.
151. United States v. Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d 490,494 (4th Cir. 1999).
152. Spencer, 727 F.3d at 1091 (footnote omitted).
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F. SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE PETITIONS
One area in which Congress may have sought to eliminate merits
review of a sentencing error claim is in the context of second or successive
postconviction petitions or motions filed in federal court. For state court
convicts, § 2244(b) requires either a new rule of constitutional law made
retroactive by the Supreme Court, or alternatively, "clear and convincing"
evidence that could not have been found through due diligence, such that
"no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the
underlying offense," to permit filing a second or successive § 2254 habeas
petition motion.15 3 Section 2255 contains the same restriction, requiring
"clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have
found the movant guilty of the offense." 54 These restrictions, adopted as
part of AEDPA, on second or successive petitions could be interpreted to
exclude sentencing errors that are not related to the jury's determination of
guilt. Some courts have held that this language bars challenges to a
sentence, given the language about whether the factfmder would have
found guilt; others have permitted challenges to death sentences despite
that language. 55 Perhaps an equitable exception to the second or
successive petition rule could be recognized by courts, but so far, that has
not occurred. Following the Supreme Court's reasoning in McQuiggin v.
Perkins, courts should not lightly assume that Congress meant to eliminate
the traditional miscarriage of justice exception; the Court emphasized that
"[t]he miscarriage of justice exception, our decisions bear out, survived
AEDPA's passage." 56  On the other hand, the McQuiggin Court
emphasized that the AEDPA second or successive petition provisions
"constrained the application of the exception," and how the analysis would
153. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2012).
154. Id. § 2255(h)(1). That restriction does not require that "new evidence be rooted in
constitutional error at trial." Case v. Hatch,No. 11-2094, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 7742, at *48 (10th Cir.
Apr. 12, 2013).
155. Some courts have held § 2255(h)(1) "does not encompass challenges to a sentence." In re
Webster, 605 F.3d 256, 257 (5th Cir. 2010). See also Hope v. United States, 108 F.3d 119, 120 (7th Cir.
1997) ("We conclude that a successive motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ... may not be filed on the basis
of newly discovered evidence unless the motion challenges the conviction and not merely the
sentence."). For examples of rulings in § 2254 cases interpreting § 2244(b)(2)(B), see In re Dean, 341
F.3d 1247, 1248 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing cases); In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192, 1198 (4th Cir. 1997) (en
banc) ("Under the AEDPA, an individual may not file a second or successive § 2254 petition for a writ
of habeas corpus or § 2255 motion to vacate sentence without first receiving permission to do so from
the appropriate circuit court of appeals."). Cf LaFevers v. Gibson, 238 F.3d 1263, 1267 (10th Cir.
2001) (noting circuit split but not reaching the issue). But see Babbitt v. Woodford, 177 F.3d 744, 746
(9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (noting that § 2244(b)(2)(B) permits second or successive challenge to
death sentence); Thompson v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 918, 923-24 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (same).
156. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1932 (2013).
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proceed for sentencing error claims is unclear.1 57
The Eleventh Circuit in its en banc decision in Gilbert v. United
States, which addressed whether to recognize a miscarriage of justice
exception to the second or successive petition provisions, emphasized
finality: "Sentencing guidelines provisions are many and complex, the
English language and those who use it are imperfect, and the case law
about what various and sundry guidelines mean and whether they apply in
different factual situations is in a constant state of flux." 58 The court
explained:
Consider just a few examples of enhancement terms which lend
themselves to litigation about their extent and scope, and thereby open
up the possibility of clarifying case law years after sentences are
imposed: "physical contact," "bodily injury," "substantial bodily injury,"
"permanent or life-threatening bodily injury," "reckless conduct,"
"custody, care[,] or supervisory control of the defendant,"
"uncontrollable circumstances," "substantial disruption of public,
governmental, or business functions or services," "a pattern of activity,"
"a substantial part of a fraudulent scheme," "personal information," and
"abuse of a position of trust." Those terms, and many others like them,
form a seed bed from which decisions can sprout, undermining
sentencing calculations that were made years before. 159
That court also highlighted how, by enacting AEDPA revisions to
§ 2255, Congress tried to impose finality on postconviction challenges by
including a statute of limitations provision.' 60 Indeed, it is also an open
question whether an outright error in the interpretation of a guideline can
be an issue of actual innocence that might permit equitable tolling of that
statute of limitations provision. Courts have applied the miscarriage of
157. Id. at 1933. While the Court described how the second or successive petition provisions in
the AEDPA require a higher standard of proof, whether they should be interpreted to include or exclude
sentencing error claims raises a very different interpretive question.
158. Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293, 1309 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc). In contrast, the
Eleventh Circuit has highlighted for the purposes of a first § 2255 motion, that for the career offender
designation, "a sentencing error like the one here can amount to a fundamental defect that inherently
creates a complete miscarriage of justice." Spencer v. United States, 727 F.3d 1076, 1088 (11th Cir.
2013), reh'g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 4315. The Eleventh Circuit has
since added that for a sentencing error claim to be brought using the Savings Clause, "the claim must be
based upon a retroactively applicable Supreme Court decision," and "the Supreme Court decision must
have overturned a circuit precedent that squarely resolved the claim so that the petitioner had no
genuine opportunity to raise it at trial, on appeal, or in his first § 2255 motion." Williams v. Warden,
713 F.3d 1332, 1343 (llth Cir. 2013).
159. Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1310 (footnote omitted).
160. Id. See also 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (noting that second or successive motions must either
contain new evidence or new constitutional rules).
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justice exception to procedural default analysis under § 2255 as well.'
Other circuits suggest that the § 2255 "Savings Clause," which permits a
habeas petition to be filed should that § 2255 remedy not be adequate or
effective as a substitute for habeas corpus,16 2 might permit an inmate to use
habeas corpus to pursue late filed sentencing challenges for a claim of
actual innocence of sentence.' 63 Indeed, in a development typical of the
convoluted case law in this area, the Seventh Circuit takes the more
expansive approach on this Savings Clause question than the Eleventh
Circuit, disagreeing with Gilbert and concluding that "a petitioner may
utilize the savings clause to challenge the misapplication of the career
offender [g]uideline," at least for a prisoner sentenced pre-Booker.164 To be
sure, claims of constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel can also
supply a separate basis to indirectly attack a sentencing error.
III. RETHINKING THE ROLE OF ACCURACY IN SENTENCING
A. A SINGLE INNOCENCE OF SENTENCE GATEWAY STANDARD
While ostensibly applying the same miscarriage of justice standard,
courts have sometimes been unwilling to entertain otherwise barred
sentencing error claims based on a range of interpretations of what a
miscarriage of justice means in the sentencing context. The approaches
toward cognizably and procedurally available challenges to sentencing
errors vary depending on the court's concept of what innocence means, the
type of sentencing error asserted, and the procedural posture of the claim.
As described, courts define their concept of cognizable error using the
statutory maximum sentences (and perhaps they will extend it to statutory
minimums), to the sentencing guidelines, to notions of retroactivity drawn
from postconviction law, and to a lesser extent, relying on language from
Supreme Court decisions describing innocence gateways in the context of
postconviction review of state convictions. An error of the same gravity, in
terms of its effect on the sentence, may be treated differently depending on
161. Spencer, 727 F.3d at 1090 n.27 ("Confusingly, the phrase 'miscarriage of justice' is used in
determining both whether a claim is cognizable under § 2255 and whether a claim can be reviewed in
spite of procedural default.").
162. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).
163. See Jones v. Castillo, 489 F. App'x 864, 866 (6th Cir. 2012) ("Claims alleging 'actual
innocence' of a sentencing enhancement cannot be raised under § 2241."), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1632,
reh'g denied, 133 S. Ct. 2387 (2013) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision); In re Bradford, 660
F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 2011) (same). But see Chaplin v. Hickey, 458 F. App'x 827, 827 (11th Cir.
2012) (per curiam) (allowing a petition for writ of habeas corpus if prospective petitioner was sentenced
to a prison term longer than the statutory maximum applicable to the crime).
164. Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 588 (7th Cir. 2013).
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whether the error arose from an erroneous interpretation of a guidelines
provision, an element of a sentence enhancing offense, a guidelines
provision using language borrowed from an element of a crime, or a
guidelines provision based on a prior conviction since vacated. Depending
on the type of error, particular procedural posture, and how the particular
federal court of appeals frames its definition of miscarriage of justice, relief
may be possible despite a plea waiver or postappeal. These distinctions
cannot support the weight placed upon them. All sentencing error claims
should be cognizable, under a single miscarriage of justice standard across
each type of sentencing error claim and each procedural context in which
they may arise, creating a single miscarriage of justice gateway permitting
sentencing error claims to be litigated.
A far simpler and consistent standard should be adopted. I propose an
across the board more likely than not standard for defining and remedying
sentencing errors. That is the Supreme Court's miscarriage of justice
standard, defined in Schlup in the context of how a habeas judge reviews a
state conviction. 1s However, for sentencing errors, the question is whether
a reasonable judge, not factfinder, would more likely than not reach a
different sentence. That standard is not necessarily an easy standard to
meet. Making all sentencing error claims cognizable-even postappeal-
despite otherwise applicable procedural bars under such a standard, would
not open the floodgates too far. 166 Courts have noted in the various
sentencing contexts in which they have applied it that it is not an everyday
case in which it is more likely than not that no reasonable factfinder would
reach the same sentence. The Supreme Court overstated this in its
McQuiggin decision by calling the category of cases that satisfy the Schlup
standard one that is "severely confined."16' The Court in House v. Bell
better described the appropriate analysis as "holistic," and considering "all
the evidence," including evidence that was either excluded or unavailable
at the time the lower court conducted sentencing.168
Consistent adoption of the miscarriage of justice standard avoids
tangled questions of (1) whether the error in question implicates an element
of the offense, or language drawn from an element; (2) whether the
165. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995) ("To establish the requisite probability, the
petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him
in the light of the new evidence.").
166. On when and whether floodgates arguments are themselves supported, see generally Marin
K. Levy, Judging the Flood ofLitigation, 80 U. CHI. L. REv. 1007 (2013).
167. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1933 (2013).
168. House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 539 (2006) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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sentence was in excess of the maximum, or altered the minimum, or
(3) whether the procedural context is whether to excuse a waiver, an
unpreserved sentencing error, a procedural default, or the application of the
§ 2255 Savings Clause. Whether the Supreme Court will adopt such a clear
and consistent standard across each of these areas is another question. On
the one hand, in 2013 the Court in McQuiggin was reluctant to assume that
Congress would mean to displace the availability of miscarriage of justice
exceptions to procedural restrictions on judicial review. On the other hand,
the Court has tended to keep the plain error doctrine vague, preserving
discretion and splits among the lower courts that define a miscarriage of
justice and the other factors that could permit granting relief on an
unpreserved sentencing error. Lower courts could add some sense to these
confused areas of sentencing law by adopting a single consistent standard
for when a sentencing error constitutes a miscarriage of justice.
Should the Court return to the issue left open in Dretke, an innocence
gateway for sentencing should be recognized. An actual innocence of
sentence gateway exception should apply in both § 2255 and § 2254
litigation. In § 2255, to be sure, if a claim passes through the gateway,
relief may follow, since § 2255 permits outright relief for erroneous
sentences. Similarly, in federal appeals, having satisfied the plain error
standard, the error may be outright corrected. In contrast, in § 2254 cases,
having passed through the gateway, a court must then consider the merits
of the underlying claim, most likely a claim that counsel was ineffective for
failing to assure that the error was corrected at the time of sentencing.
There is one area less amenable to the proposed "fix": a Schlup-type
standard does not as readily apply to the AEDPA restrictions on second or
successive petitions and motions.
While § 2254 litigation raises very different federalism concerns, the
concern with upsetting state court judgments, or finality, is much reduced
when the remedy is an order for resentencing. Indeed, capital sentencing
errors are already cognizable in § 2254 litigation, and complex death
penalty phase sentencing is a far more burdensome (although more
critically important) hearing to redo than the typical sentencing, which
might not require a hearing at all. To be sure, there is a separate comity
concern with having federal judges reviewing errors in state court
sentencing determinations under state law schemes. However, the quite
demanding miscarriage of justice standard would limit gateway relief to
cases involving significant errors. In § 2254 cases, moreover, having
satisfied a sentence gateway exception, the prisoner would still have to
prevail on the underlying constitutional claim.
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To the extent that the lower courts' varying approaches toward the
cognoscibility of sentencing error claims display a concern for finality, that
concern is partially misplaced. Reversing a sentence does not involve the
outright vacating of a conviction. As noted, the burden of simply
resentencing is far slighter than a retrial. Of course, there is a separate
burden caused by the increased collateral litigation that would result with
an expansion of the options available to challenge sentencing errors. Again,
the demanding miscarriage of justice standard, as well as the need to
prevail on an underlying claim in § 2254 cases, can make the litigation far
more manageable.
Moreover, there is not the same tension between accuracy and finality
in the context of sentencing as in the context of guilt determinations.
Although accuracy may have been less traditionally valued during
sentencing, so has finality. It is always far more difficult to revisit criminal
cases after a conviction. After a conviction, a person "does not come before
the Court as one who is 'innocent,' but, on the contrary, as one who has
been convicted by due process of law."' 6 9 However, after a judge imposed
sentence, there is not the same justification for strict adherence to rules of
finality. There is no need to do over a criminal trial; as Sarah Russell has
detailed, the burden of a resentencing is slight, and "at a resentencing, the
court, unlike a jury at trial, can rely on evidence presented and findings
made at the initial sentencing proceeding."' 0 The new sentencing hearing
may produce far more accurate results than the first, and it is not time
consuming to conduct, particularly since some of the sentencing analysis
conducted initially may be quite correct and unnecessary to duplicate.
In other respects, finality in sentencing is already given much less
weight. Revisions to sentencing guidelines may be made retroactive.1 71
Appeals courts may reconsider sentences; finality-based interpretations
stand on weaker ground post-Booker. Yet, as described, courts are
generally quite reluctant to revisit sentencing, and their reasoning typically
draws on inapposite standards from habeas corpus that emphasizes finality
for reasons of federalism and reluctance to overturn state trial convictions,
169. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1993).
170. Russell, supra note 60, at 83.
171. See Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2335 (2012) (finding that the Fair Sentencing
Act is retroactive to cases in which sentencing occurred after enactment of legislation reducing
mandatory minimums); U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, PRELIMINARY CRACK COCAINE RETROACTIVITY
DATA REPORT tbl.3 (2011), http://www.ussc.gov/Data andStatistics/FederalSentencingStatistics/
CrackCocaineAmendment/20110600_USSCCrackCocaineRetroactivityData Report.pdf
(finding that over 25,000 reduction requests have been made, in response to retroactive 2007
amendments to guidelines reducing the crack-to-powder ratio, and over 64 percent were granted).
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or deference to trial court discretion. Reflexive repetition of the mantra of
finality merely calls attention to the relative lack of justification for
avoiding the correction of sentencing errors.
Postconviction statutes do not themselves constrain judicial review of
sentencing errors. Section 2254 refers broadly to claims challenging
custody, and § 2255 permits relief for sentencing errors. The Savings
Clause in § 2255(e) also permits resort to habeas corpus should remedies
under § 2255 prove inadequate or ineffective. Federal courts have
developed an intricate jurisprudence-drawing on postconviction
miscarriage of justice exception standards, constitutional retroactivity
standards, changes in sentencing standards on appeal, and policy interests
in finality-to permit some postappeal sentencing challenges and not
others. The Supreme Court, to the extent it has said anything about this
problem, noted § 2255 remains available for sentencing errors implicating a
miscarriage of justice. Adopting a version of Schlup's more likely than not
miscarriage of justice exception would not significantly burden lower
courts. It also fits better with the broad directive that appellate courts
review sentences for their reasonableness post-Booker, and it would avoid
some of the confusion and inconsistency in applying miscarriage of justice
concepts to the sentencing error context.
B. CONSTITUTIONAL REGULATION OF SENTENCNG ERRORS
The Supreme Court has recognized Due Process Clause and Sixth
Amendment constitutional criminal procedure claims that can permit,
indirectly, a challenge to a sentencing error. Having passed through an
innocence of sentence gateway, in a § 2254 case, the prisoner would have
to then obtain relief on such a claim. Scholars have tended to focus on
Confrontation Clause rights at sentencing, but there are other recognized
due process rights that may enhance accuracy at sentencing to some
degree.' 72 One due process claim remains undeveloped: the Court has
highlighted, without identifying any such circumstances, that "extreme
circumstances" might require clear and convincing evidence at sentencing
as a matter of due process.'73 Second, Brady v. Maryland applies at
sentencing, and due process also prevents a judge from sentencing a
172. See Sara Sun Beale, Procedural Issues Raised by Guidelines Sentencing: The Constitutional
Significance of the "Elements of the Sentence," 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 147, 157 (1993) (discussing
general due process claims); John G. Douglass, Confronting Death: Sixth Amendment Rights at Capital
Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 1967, 1972 (2005) (arguing "for a unified theory of Sixth Amendment
rights" in capital cases and sentencing).
173. United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 156 (1997) (per curiam).
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defendant based on confidential information not disclosed to the defense.174
However, Brady violations may arise (or come to light) infrequently.
More important, in a series of Sixth Amendment and Due Process
Clause decisions the Supreme Court has held that Strickland applies to the
sentencing phase of capital trials, obliging defense counsel to adequately
develop factual evidence supporting a defendant's mitigation case.,' The
Court also assumed in Glover v. United States that the Strickland
ineffective assistance of counsel test applies at sentencing in a noncapital
case.' 6 Of course, an inmate would have to show counsel was ineffective
in a way that prejudiced the sentence. Given the judge's substantial
discretion, that may be difficult to do where the judge also has access to
information from prosecutors and from the presentence report.' 7 7 However,
information uniquely in the control of the defense includes mitigation
evidence concerning the defendant's background, information that the
defense may have to investigate, and which has been the subject of a series
of rulings by the Court in the death penalty context. Although in a nondeath
penalty case such mitigation evidence might play a far milder role, a
complete failure to present the judge with such evidence might support an
ineffective assistance claim. A failure to challenge an outright error in
applying sentencing guidelines, or in the calculation of the sentence itself,
would raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not easy to win. Showing
prejudice is particularly difficult. While in the trial context there may be a
difficult question whether "trial strategies, in retrospect, might be
174. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). See also Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 351
(1977) (finding due process violation when defendant sentenced to death based on nondisclosed
information in presentence report); United States v. Nash, 29 F.3d 1195, 1202 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding
that the defendant has the burden of demonstrating withholding of information by showing more than
"pure speculation"); United States v. Severson, 3 F.3d 1005, 1012-13 (7th Cir. 1993) (remanding the
case to reconsider evidence previously disclosed to defendant but without disclosing its significance);
United States v. Weintraub, 871 F.2d 1257, 1265 (5th Cir. 1989) (vacating the defendant's sentence and
remanding the case for a new sentencing hearing based on material "withheld impeachment evidence").
175. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 380-81 (2005) ("This case, like some others recently,
looks to norms of adequate investigation in preparing for the sentencing phase of a capital trial, when
defense counsel's job is to counter the State's evidence of aggravated culpability with evidence in
mitigation."); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (holding that a court must ask "whether the
investigation supporting counsel's decision not to introduce mitigating evidence of [the defendant's]
background was itselfreasonable").
176. Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 202-04 (2001). See also Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S.
128, 137 (1967) (requiring right to counsel at deferred sentencing).
177. See, e.g., Spaziano v. Singletary, 36 F.3d 1028, 1039 (1lth Cir. 1994) ("We have held many
times that [r]easonably effective representation cannot and does not include a requirement to make
arguments based on predictions of how the law may develop." (alteration in original) (quoting Elledge
v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1439, 1443 (11th Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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criticized," in the sentencing context, as the Court outlined in Glover, a
judge considers "the sentencing calculation itself," an error that "would
have been correctable on appeal."17 1 Under that reasoning, federal courts
should be more willing to correct sentencing errors, where prejudice is
relatively straightforward to assess, than errors affecting a trial. That said,
assessing prejudice in the context of sentencing, given substantial
discretion in application of sentencing guidelines, often may not be
straightforward, and in other rulings the Court has suggested less openness
to correcting sentencing errors.17 9
The Supreme Court's plea bargaining rulings in 2012, Lafler v.
Cooper80 and Missouri v. Frye,1 8' requiring counsel to affectively advise a
client concerning the sentencing implications of a plea bargain, may impact
the degree to which a lawyer informs a client that certain facts should or
should not be conceded for purposes of a guilty plea. Whether ineffective
assistance claims can provide a vehicle to later correct sentencing errors,
and not just failure to communicate during plea bargaining, or failure to
advise a client of disastrous choices made during plea bargaining, remains
a difficult question. Indeed, courts have struggled with the question when
and whether resentencing is the remedy for ineffective assistance of
counsel during sentencing.
C. ENHANCING ACCURACY OF FACTFINDING AT SENTENCING
What does sentencing error, a complicated and unsettled concept, have
to do with the problem of wrongful convictions? Sentencing traditionally is
animated by concerns of (1) just or proportional punishment in light of the
seriousness of the offense, and (2) recidivism concerns, including by
considering the offender's criminal history, risk of future offending, any
cooperation, and deterrence goals. However, sentencing guidelines include
178. Glover, 531 U.S. at 204. See also id. ("We express no opinion on the ultimate merits of
Glover's claim because the question of deficient performance is not before us, but it is clear that
prejudice flowed from the asserted error in sentencing.").
179. For an excellent explanation of the problem, with a proposed solution focusing on there
being a "(1) reasonable probability of a second plea that is more favorable to the defendant; or
(2) reasonable probability of a sentence that is more favorable with effective assistance than it was with
ineffective assistance," see Jenny Roberts, Proving Prejudice, Post-Padilla, 54 How. L.J. 693, 733
(2011). One example in which the Court placed greater weight on finality in the sentencing context was
in Chaidez v. United States, in which the Court held that its plea bargaining ruling in Padilla v.
Kentucky was a new rule, despite being an application of the ineffective assistance of counsel standard,
and would not be held retroactive. Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1105-06 (2013) (citing
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 369-73 (2010)).
180. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012).
181. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1405-06 (2012).
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a range of specific provisions that may enhance punishment based on
factfinding that, like all factfinding, potentially is fallible. As discussed,
appellate and postconviction courts could be more open to revisiting claims
of sentencing error, even where the error did not involve factual innocence
of a predicate conviction. Perhaps executive officials and pardon boards
could consider sentencing accuracy when considering pardons. As of 2013,
the Department of Justice is adopting guidelines to encourage a more
lenient exercise of charging discretion in low level drug cases, in part to
avoid application of overly harsh mandatory minimum sentences. 182
A separate question is whether appeals or postconviction rulings
regarding sentencing errors create sufficient incentives to improve accuracy
of sentencing outcomes. Much of the literature about causes of wrongful
convictions has sensibly focused on producing more reliable evidence at
the front end during criminal investigations. Sentencing might indirectly
benefit from such improvements. Whether the accuracy of the sentencing
process itself can be improved is a question beyond the scope of this
Article.183 I note that several reforms have been proposed by others. For
example, J. J. Prescott and Sonja Starr have proposed a range of reforms
that might address some of those challenges, including considering use of
some evidentiary restrictions during sentencing, bifurcation of sentencing,
and adoption of clearer sentencing instructions to the jury. 18 4 Another
improvement could be to apply Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals18' at sentencing, and more rigorously in criminal cases
generally, where lower courts have relied on expert evidence, such as
ballistics, without conducting a Daubert inquiry into whether that evidence
is valid and reliable.' 8 6 More jury factfinding may play a role post-
Apprendi, and in jurisdictions that use juries to sentence. As Andrew
182. Eric Holder, Att'y Gen., Dep't of Justice, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American
Bar Association's House of Delegates (Aug. 12, 2013), available at
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2013/ag-speech-i 30812.html.
183. For more information, see Alan C. Michaels, Trial Rights at Sentencing, 81 N.C. L. REV.
1771, 1838-39 (2003) ("Indeed, the due process standard adopted by many courts of appeals seems to
be more lenient than the statutory requirement of reliability for hearsay at sentencing imposed by the
United States Sentencing Guidelines, which require that the information have 'sufficient indicia of
reliability to support its probable accuracy."'); Herman, supra note 90, at 312 (discussing modified real
offense sentencing versus a charge-based system of sentencing).
184. J.J. Prescott & Sonja Starr, Improving Criminal Jury Decision Making After the Blakely
Revolution, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 301, 355.
185. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993).
186. See United States v. Hart, 324 F.3d 740, 746-48 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (analyzing the defendant's
evidentiary claims). Indeed, in federal death penalty cases, federal courts have concluded that Daubert
does not apply, where "[n]o Circuit ... has applied Daubert to sentencing." United States v. Fields, 483
F.3d 313, 342 (5th Cir. 2007).
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Taslitz has explained, "Because the trial and sentencing phases both
involve fact[finding], ... lessons about how to get these facts right in one
phase can illuminate how to do so in the other phase, even if each phase
ultimately also involves some important differences."' 8 7 Indeed, there may
be some reasons to think jurors are less good at making certain factual
findings important to sentencing. For juries in death penalty cases, some
states have considered bringing in guilt phase considerations regarding the
strength of the evidence. Maryland adopted such a regime by limiting death
eligibility to cases with certain types of evidence deemed more accurate.' 88
The statutory language was odd in several respects, but the concept was
novel even if it is unused, since Maryland has abolished the death
penalty.189
Generally, improving the sentencing process raises harder questions in
connection with guidelines provisions that themselves do not make entirely
clear what proof is demanded. For example, in white collar cases, judges
rely on evidence concerning the size of the actual or intended "loss" or
"gain," when applying one of the most commonly used guidelines
provisions.' 90 Judges have criticized vague language of that provision,
calling the loss guidelines an "utter travesty of justice",'9 and "a black stain
on common sense." 92 Stephen F. Smith argues overcriminalization should
implicate not just the broad crime definition, but "sentencing problems that
make a broad and deep criminal code so troubling in practice."' 93 That is a
still larger problem beyond the scope of this Article; I just note that we
187. Andrew E. Taslitz, Sentencing Lessons from the Innocence Movement, CRIM. JUST., Summer
2006, at 6, 7.
188. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-202(a)(3) (LexisNexis 2012).
189. Heightened accuracy has been a feature of other not adopted death penalty reform proposals,
such as those of the Massachusetts Governor's Council on Capital Punishment, which proposed that
during capital sentencing stage, the jury should be required to find evidence reaching the level of
"conclusive scientific evidence" or "scientific certainty." JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN ET AL., GOVERNOR'S
COUNCIL ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 20 (2004), http://www.lawlib.state.ma.us/docs/5-3-
04governorsreportcapitalpunishment.pdf. See also Joseph L. Hoffmann, Protecting the Innocent: The
Massachusetts Governor's Council Report, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 561, 570 (2005) (discussing
possible jury requirements and instructions at sentencing hearings); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M.
Steiker, Should Abolitionists Support Legislative "Reform" of the Death Penalty?, 63 OHIO ST. L.J.
417, 423 (2002) (taking a skeptical view toward DNA testing as a potential legislative reform of the
death penalty).
190. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 211.1 (2012) (theft and fraud loss and gain
guideline).
191. United States v. Parris, 573 F. Supp. 2d 744, 751 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting United States v.
Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d 506, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
192. Id at 754.




should continue to consider ways to improve standards of proof and
evidentiary standards at sentencing to minimize errors.
D. EVIDENCE BASED SENTENCING
State sentencing statutes increasingly include provisions geared
toward the accuracy of prediction of future violence, in part because, as
Rachel Barkow has described, many state sentencing commissions are not
focused on costs of incarceration.194 In contrast, 18 U.S.C. § 3553
notoriously does not include rehabilitative potential as a relevant offender
characteristic, noting such facts are not ordinarily relevant,19 ' although the
Supreme Court in Gall emphasized that "self-motivated rehabilitation" was
very much relevant to the question of adequate deterrence.196 A growing
body of research supports use of empirically validated risk assessment to
inform sentencing.197 As more states seek to prioritize prison resources,
they may increasingly ask judges to rely on empirically validated means to
assess a convict's threat of recidivism, and calibrate sentences accordingly.
Roger Warren of the National Center for State Courts, in a call for more
"evidence-based" sentencing guidelines, explains:
In light of the fact that so many crimes are committed by a small
percentage of repeat offenders, and the fact that we are becoming
increasingly knowledgeable about how to reduce recidivism among
offenders who pose a moderate-to-high risk of re-offense, risk reduction
and recidivism reduction should be principal goals of effective
sentencing policy.198
Doing so raises questions regarding which risk factors should be
considered (John Monahan has argued, for example, that only validated
194. Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REv. 715, 808-09 (2005). For a
critique of the focus on costs in sentencing, see generally Michael Tonry, Essay, Making Peace, Not a
Desert: Penal Reform Should Be About Values Not Justice Reinvestment, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB.
POL'Y 637 (2011).
195. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).
196. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 59 (2007).
197. See JOHN MONAHAN, HENRY J. STEADMAN & ERIC SILVER, RETHINKING RISK ASSESSMENT:
THE MACARTHUR STUDY OF MENTAL DISORDER AND VIOLENCE 7-9 (2001) (discussing research
strategies regarding violence risk assessment); John Monahan & Henry J. Steadman, Violence Risk
Assessment: A Quarter Century of Research, in THE EVOLUTION OF MENTAL HEALTH LAW 195, 205
(Lynda E. Frost & Richard J. Bonnie eds., 2001) (discussing seven characteristics essential to violence
prediction research); Jennifer L. Skeem & John Monahan, Current Directions in Violence Risk
Assessment, 20 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SC. 38, 38-39 (2011) (discussing the use of violence
risk assessment in the legal context).
198. Roger K. Warren, Evidence-Based Practices and State Sentencing Policy: Ten Policy
Initiatives to Reduce Recidivism, 82 IND. L.J. 1307, 1310 (2007).
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risk factors should be used in the context of criminal sentencing' 99).
Virginia's new Criminal Sentencing Commission developed a risk-based
instrument to divert low risk offenders to nonprison sanctions, 200 and
adopted the approach statewide in 2003.201 As of 2008, Pennsylvania
tasked its Commission on Sentencing to implement a sentence risk
assessment instrument.202 States may increasingly adopt such approaches,
not just for sentencing, but to provide services to former convicts as they
reenter society, and to assist in development of specialized courts and
alternatives to punishment. 203
CONCLUSION
Federal district judge John Gleeson has suggested that lawyers should
create a "Mercy Project," modeled on the Innocence Project, to advocate
for convicts sentenced to overly harsh sentences under the pre-Booker U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines. 204 Should accuracy, even if not in the conventional
sense of "another person did it," also play a role in such work? Perhaps the
focus should properly be on eliminating sentencing disparities, or early
release to prisoners whose conduct was not particularly aggravated, or who
have been exemplary prisoners and have rehabilitated themselves. Some
have criticized the primary focus of the "Innocence Movement" on factual
innocence, and not claims of legal innocence or procedural unfairness,
much less sentencing error.205 A fairer criticism might begin with
199. John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among Prisoners,
Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REv. 391, 428, 435 (2006). See also Skeem & Monahan, supra note
197, at 40 (noting that relevant data suggest no significant difference between prediction performance
of different validated instruments).
200. Richard P. Kern & Meredith Farrar-Owens, Sentencing Guidelines with Integrated Offender
Risk Assessment, 16 FED. SENT'G REP. 165, 165 (2004).
201. Matthew Kleiman, Brian J. Ostrom & Neal B. Kauder, Risk Assessment: A New Approach to
Sentencing Non-Violent Offenders, 10 CASELOAD HIGHLIGHTS 1, 12 (2004), available at
http://cdml 6501 .contentdm.oclk.org/cdm/ref/collection/criminallid/90. See also id. at 10-12 (discussing
the Virginia approach in greater detail); BRIAN J. OSTROM ET AL., OFFENDER RISK ASSESSMENT IN
VIRGINIA 1 (2002), http://www.vcsc.virginia.gov/risk-offrpt.pdf (advocating statewide adoption of the
approach).
202. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2154.7(a)-(b) (2013). See also Risk Assessment Project, PA. COMM'N
SENT'G, http://pcs.1a.psu.edu/publications-and-research/research-and-evaluation-reports/risk-assessment
(last updated Dec. 7, 2012) (reporting on the commission's progress).
203. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 182.515(3) (2005) (defining evidence-based programs).
204. Ethan Bronner, Long Prison Term Is Less So Thanks to Judge's Regrets, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
28, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/29/us/long-prison-term-shortened-by-judges-
regrets.html?pagewanted=all. New York University's Center on the Administration of Criminal Justice
has taken up that invitation. See Ctr. on the Admin. of Crim. Law, The Mercy Project, NYU LAW,
http://www.law.nyu.edulcenters/adminofcriminallaw/mercyproject (last visited Feb. 19, 2014).
205. Emily Hughes, Innocence Unmodified, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1085 (2011).
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legislators and judges who have, perhaps understandably, prioritized
certain types of innocence claims. For example, it is a staple of modern
federal habeas corpus that serious constitutional violations may go
unremedied absent additional evidence of innocence allowing a federal
judge to surmount otherwise applicable procedural bars.
Given ferment in federal appellate review of sentencing, perhaps it is
no surprise that judges are divided in approaches toward claims of
sentencing error that were waived in plea agreements, not preserved for
appeal, or raised postconviction. Yet in precisely the federal context in
which at least some sentencing errors are cognizable, § 2255, federal courts
have hewed toward remedying only very limited categories of sentencing
errors, such as those that involve vacatur of a predicate crime. Federal
courts have reflexively relied on notions of finality that have far less
relevance absent federalism and finality concerns that arise when reviewing
a state trial conviction. Resentencing is comparatively less burdensome to
conduct, and courts should construe miscarriage of justice exceptions to
permit a wide range of sentencing errors to be considered on the merits
postconviction. Already, federal courts adopt a more flexible view of a
miscarriage of justice in the context of appeals waivers, recognizing that
the burden of resentencing is not great, and any such concept must be
flexible given the nature of discretionary sentencing, and the need to ensure
serious errors are corrected. Some courts adopt a more flexible view of
miscarriage of justice in the context of assessing plain error on appeal,
noting sentencing errors raise different issues than guilt phase errors that
might require a retrial.
The miscarriage of justice standard should consistently apply to
excuse procedural bars otherwise applicable to all claims of sentencing
error. If a reasonable judge would more likely than not reach a different
sentence, then the sentencing error claim may be considered, and if the
relevant underlying claim is granted, then the case may be remanded for a
resentencing, among other remedies. Courts of appeals should apply the
demanding but holistic innocence gateway standard that the Supreme Court
has instructed them to apply in § 2255 and § 2254 contexts. Whatever
one's view of the sufficiency of the process provided at sentencing, that
process plays a far more crucial role than ever, driving plea bargains and
results after trial. Sentencing errors are inevitable, and although claims of
sentencing error can raise complex issues, the practical importance of
addressing their merits is simple: convicts should not serve added time
based on errors. A claim of innocence of a sentence is not like a claim of
innocence of a conviction, but neither does finality play the same role,
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given the relative ease of resentencing. The very ambiguity of the meaning
of accuracy at sentencing may not be a weakness, but a great strength.
